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**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
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THE U.S. FREEDOM AGENDA IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College, the Department of Defense or the U.K. Ministry of Defence.

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ABSTRACT

The Bush Administration's foreign policy has comprised three key components: security through forward defence; a black-and-white view of the post-9/11 world; and, most pervasively, the so-called *freedom agenda*. These elements combine in an approach that many see as imperious and detached from on-the-ground realities, particularly in the Middle East. The thesis of this paper is that the United States requires a more balanced and realistic policy agenda in the Middle East, which discards the strident promotion of constitutional democracy in favour of a less imperious approach based on values that are meaningful to Middle Eastern people and societies. The paper suggests that such values include freedom, human rights, equality, consent-based government, the rule of law, sovereignty and responsibility.

Revised U.S. policies and supporting strategies should reflect the complex and volatile relationship between the Western and Islamic worlds. Some analyses suggest that their clash is inevitable, while others offer hope for an "alliance of civilizations." Such an alliance would require a concerted effort to reconcile Western and Islamic ideologies, which do not appear to be wholly incompatible. However, interpretation matters. It is vital that the United States and her allies seek, through their policies and actions in the Middle East, to empower Muslims who advocate moderate interpretations of the Islamic texts. Radical Islamists and so-called jihadi fighters must be denied their theological credibility.

The U.S. agenda in the Middle East should also attempt to empower moderate and liberalizing political influences in the region. Although 61% of Middle Eastern countries

are considered by Freedom House to be “Not Free”, Middle Eastern regimes occupy a broad spectrum and many are undertaking cautious programmes of liberalization.

Political Islam is an increasingly important feature of this social and political landscape – but not necessarily a dangerous one. Islamist political parties should be encouraged to operate in the mainstream of politics and to exert moderating influences over their followers – especially young people who are drawn towards radicalism.

Thus, the United States should discard her strident promotion of constitutional democracy in favour of more carefully focused encouragement of social, economic and political reform in the Middle East. This, however, requires renewed diplomatic engagement with both friends and traditional enemies and re-ignition of the Middle East Peace Process; and the latter cannot occur without a more even-handed approach to Israel and the Palestinians. A revised U.S. agenda must also be demonstrably ethical, thereby addressing what many perceive to be a loss of moral authority.

The recommendations developed in the paper would form the basis of a more balanced policy agenda in the Middle East. As Madeleine Albright put it: “policy must begin with the world as is but also work for what we would like it to be.”

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

U.S. presidents have differed in their zeal for promoting democracy and the balances they have struck between idealism and realism in foreign affairs; yet U.S. foreign relations have always been underpinned by democratic values. President George W. Bush has placed the so-called *freedom agenda* at the heart of his foreign policy and national strategy. Democracy is the cornerstone of the *Bush Doctrine*.

The second major pillar of the Bush Doctrine is security. Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, President Bush advised the world that “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”¹ and informed the American people that “we’re at war.”² This war comprised the Global War on Terror and interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. (The latter two campaigns reflected a strategy often called *security through forward defence*.)

The Bush Administration’s foreign policy agenda is dominated by the Middle East (an overview map of which is in Appendix C, Figure C1). In his 2007 State of the Union Address, President Bush stated that “nothing is more important at this moment in our history than for America to succeed in the Middle East.”³ The Bush Administration’s contention that enduring security depends on the progress of democracy has been particularly conspicuous in its Middle Eastern agenda. The United States’ strategic endstates for Iraq and Afghanistan both feature the creation of democracies.

¹ President George W Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 Sep 2001, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> on 18 Nov 2006.

² President Bush speaking to reporters at Camp David on 15 September 2001, accessed at CNN.com: <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/15/bush.terrorism/> on 23 November 2006.

³ President Bush, the 2007 State of the Union Address, Washington D.C., 23 January 2007, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070123-2.html> on 24 February 2007.

These endstates epitomize the first of two major weaknesses in the Bush Doctrine. The Administration's efforts to export what General Anthony C. Zinni called "shake and bake democracy"⁴ have often ignored the important preliminary steps needed to give electoral democracy a reasonable chance of success. These include the expansion of civil liberties, creation of grass roots civil institutions and political movements, and measures to safeguard individual human rights. Without such preparatory steps, constitutional democracy is likely to prove too high a hurdle for Middle Eastern societies still characterized by economic deprivation and social and political repression.

The second weakness is a widespread perception of hypocrisy and a consequent erosion of the United States' moral authority. Strident U.S. rhetoric on democracy and so-called American values contains a trap: it raises the standard against which the United States herself is judged. For example, while many rational observers sympathize with the United States' dilemma in dealing with suspected terrorist detainees, the stridency of her rhetoric on the subject of human rights leaves her open to criticism. Equally, the United States' close relationship with Saudi Arabia is at odds with her commitment to reflect foreign powers' advancement of democracy in the closeness of her relations with them. Most important of all, the Arab world regards the United States and her Middle Eastern policies through a Palestinian lens. The United States' apparently unquestioning support for Israel is interpreted by many Arabs as indifference to the fate of the Palestinians, which has diminished the United States' standing across the Arab Middle East.

In light of these apparent weaknesses in the Bush Doctrine, **the thesis of this study is that the United States requires a more balanced and realistic policy agenda in the**

⁴ General Anthony C. Zinni, speaking to the JAWS course, Joint Forces Staff College, 1 December 2007.

Middle East, which discards the strident promotion of constitutional democracy in favour of a less imperious approach based on values that are meaningful to Middle Eastern people and societies. The development of such an approach requires an understanding of the strategic environment, a determination of the compatibility of Islamic ideology and democratic values, and a realistic appreciation of political and social conditions in the Middle East. Based on this analysis, this paper will propose a set of recommendations to frame a fresh U.S. approach to Middle Eastern affairs.

The early chapters of the paper will refer generally to the United States' 'approach' or 'policy' in the Middle East. This is consistent with the Bush Administration's own use of relatively imprecise language when referring to national interests, policy goals and strategic ends, ways and means. It would be inappropriate to describe the Administration's approach to Middle Eastern affairs in terms more precise than those it uses itself. However, more specific language is used to develop the paper's recommendations in the final two chapters. The key terms are as follows:

- **Policy** is the expression of the government's *desired end state*.⁵
- **Strategic objectives (ends)** describe *what* must be accomplished, within the context of the strategic environment, in pursuit of the desired end state.⁶
- **Strategic concepts (ways)** describe *how* the objectives are to be accomplished.⁷

⁵ Harry R Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 2006, 7.

⁶ Ibid, 49 & 69.

⁷ Ibid, 69.

CHAPTER 2 – OVERVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

Today's strategic environment was summarized aptly by Harry R. Yarger as being volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous⁸. No element of the environment is more complex or more volatile than the relationship between Islamic and Western cultures. Islam did not declare war on the United States and her allies in late 2001, but Islam was, and remains, a defining characteristic of the terrorists who attacked the United States. The Bush Administration appears to hope that this is not the case and discusses Islam with palpable unease.

A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

In his book *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel P. Huntington recorded John Esposito's view of Western and Islamic civilizations "locked...in deadly combat for power, land and souls"⁹ and observed that the causes of conflict between the West and Islam "lie in the fundamental questions of power and culture." He went on to assert that "this fundamental conflict between two great civilizations...will continue to define their relations in the future even as it has defined them in the past fourteen centuries."¹⁰

Many observers identify a modern Islamic revival whereby newly self-confident Muslims, resentful of Western dominance, are determined to re-assert their own culture and beliefs. Huntington recorded the belief of Moroccan feminist Fatima Mernissi that

⁸ Ibid, 18.

⁹ Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996, 209.

¹⁰ Ibid, 212.

the West “crushes our potentialities and invades our lives with its imported products and televised movies that swamp the airways... [It] is a power that crushes us, besieges our markets, and controls our merest resources, initiatives and potentialities.”¹¹

Huntington and others assert that a continuing conflict between the two civilizations is inevitable because of this Islamic revival. He quoted Egyptian journalist Mohammed Sid-Ahmed, who wrote of “a growing clash between the Judeo-Christian Western ethic and the Islamic revival movement.” The combination of this revival with poor economic and social conditions and the Middle East’s so-called ‘youth bulge’ creates a volatile mix. Huntington summarized his discussion of Islam and the West thus:

The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and obsessed with the inferiority of their power.

The problem for Islam is the West, whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining power imposes on the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world.¹²

AN ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS?

The United Nations sought to offer a more optimistic view when it launched the *Alliance of Civilizations* initiative in 2005. Co-sponsored by the Secretary General and the Prime Ministers of Spain and Turkey, the initiative centred on a High Level Group of 20 internationally recognized and respected figures, including former-President Mohamed Khatami of Iran, the Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, Indian Member of Parliament Shobhana Bhartia, and Ali Alatas, former Foreign Minister of Indonesia. (The full list of participants is in Appendix

¹¹ Ibid, 216.

¹² Ibid, 218.

B, Table B1.) The UN stated that the initiative would “contribute to a coalescing global movement which...rejects extremism in any society. Events of recent years have exacerbated mutual suspicion, fear and misunderstanding between Islamic and Western societies. This environment has been exploited by extremists throughout the world.”¹³

The *Alliance of Civilizations* report¹⁴ agreed that “our world is alarmingly out of balance,” observing that “the last century brought unprecedented progress, prosperity, and freedom” for many, while for others “it marked an era of subjugation, humiliation and dispossession.” The report acknowledged that “polarized perceptions, fuelled by injustice and inequality, often lead to violence and conflict, threatening international stability,” but rejected the categorization of “internally fluid and diverse societies along hard-and-fast lines of civilizations.” It stated that:

The anxiety and confusion caused by the clash of civilizations theory...has distorted the terms of the discourse on the real nature of the predicament the world is facing. The history of relations between cultures is not only one of wars and confrontation. It is also based on centuries of constructive exchanges, cross-fertilization, and peaceful coexistence.¹⁵

The challenge for Western and Islamic leaders is to create conditions in which the two civilizations can coexist and cooperate peacefully, reflecting in their approaches the “more illuminating ways of understanding questions of identity, motivation and behaviour”¹⁶ identified in the *Alliance of Civilizations* report. The Middle East is the key arena for these endeavours, and no element of the West’s efforts will be more influential, or scrutinized more closely, than U.S. foreign policy.

¹³ Quoted from the UN’s Alliance of Civilizations website www.unaoc.org accessed on 30 January 2007.

¹⁴ Alliance of Civilizations Report of the High-Level Group, released on 13 November 2006 and accessed at http://www.unaoc.org/repository/HLG_Report.pdf on 30 January 2007.

¹⁵ Ibid, 3.

¹⁶ Ibid.

THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

The ‘Palestinian Question’ has special significance among the factors that cause resentment and mistrust in the Middle East. Almost all commentators on Middle Eastern issues recognize its importance. The *Alliance of Civilizations* report acknowledged its “symbolic value that colours cross-cultural and political relations” and characterized the post-1948 history of Israel as “beginning a chain of events that continues to be one of the most tortuous in relations between Western and Muslim societies.” It continued:

Israel’s continuing occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories and the unresolved status of Jerusalem – a holy city for Muslims and Christians as well as Jews – have persisted with the perceived acquiescence of Western governments and thus are primary causes of resentment and anger in the Muslim world toward Western nations. This occupation has been perceived in the Muslim world as a form of colonialism and has led many to believe, rightly or wrongly, that Israel is in collusion with “the West”.¹⁷

CONCLUSION

Whether Western and Islamic civilizations can forge an alliance or are doomed to perpetual conflict is unclear. Perhaps they can find a compromise. To be able to influence this uncertain future, the United States needs to reflect the complexities of the relationship in an approach to Middle Eastern affairs that addresses that causes of friction between the West and the Islamic Middle East – especially the Palestinian Question. The current operational landscape demands that this is done quickly. Winning the “Long War”¹⁸ demands strategies that are geared for the long term, balance idealism and realism, and embody an approach to dealing with Middle Eastern countries that is sophisticated, coherent and workable.

¹⁷ Ibid, 12.

¹⁸ General John P. Abizaid coined the term ‘long war’ in 2004 and it was used thereafter. In 2006, the Quadrennial Defence Review began: “The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war.”

CHAPTER 3 – THE BUSH DOCTRINE

INTRODUCTION

Democracy has been the predominant theme in U.S. foreign relations since 1776. When Woodrow Wilson took the United States to War in 1917, he told Congress that “The world must be made safe for democracy.”¹⁹ Rejecting the “false philosophy” of communism in his inaugural address of 1949, President Harry S Truman maintained that “Democracy alone [could]...stir the peoples of the world into triumphant action.”²⁰ In the early 21st Century, democracy remains a *casus belli* for the United States. It is President Bush’s “calling from beyond the stars.”²¹

The second key theme of the Bush Doctrine is security, which is reflected in two military interventions in the Middle East and in the Global War on Terror. The relationship between the two themes is important, but not always straightforward. The Administration suggests that democracy is a way to cure the ills of the Middle East and thus make the United States more secure. Chapter I of the 2006 *National Security Strategy* asserts that “a world of democratic, well-governed states” would be “the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.”²² Yet exporting democracy is also treated as an *end* in itself. This lack of clarity is representative of what Madeleine Albright called “the hoariest of academic debates – between the so-called realists in

¹⁹ President Woodrow Wilson’s War Message to Congress on 2 April 1917, accessed at the Brigham Young University Library at <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1917/wilswarm.html> on 4 November 2006.

²⁰ President Harry S Truman’s Inaugural Address of 20 January 1949, reproduced at the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, accessed at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/truman.htm> on 4 November 2006.

²¹ President Bush giving thanks to the US Armed Forces at a ‘Celebration of Freedom’ concert, Washington DC, 19 January 2005. He said that “We have a calling from beyond the stars to stand for freedom...”

²² *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, Ch I, 1.

foreign policy and the idealists.”²³ The need to understand the relationship between democracy and security is particularly pressing in Iraq, where a fledgling democracy struggles on amid insurgency and sectarian conflict.

An examination of the Bush doctrine must also consider the attempt to create bipolar simplicity in foreign relations by declaring that “you’re with us or against us,” defining an “Axis of Evil” and declaring that the United States is “at war”. This is also linked to the democracy theme. The 2006 *National Security Strategy* advises countries to promote democratic values in order to “cement close relations with the United States.”²⁴

THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY

In his first term inaugural address in 2001, President Bush affirmed his commitment to promoting freedom and democracy on the global stage:

Through much of the last century, America’s faith in freedom and democracy was a rock in a raging sea...If our country does not lead the cause of freedom, it will not be led...America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom.²⁵

In his 2002 State of the Union Address, just months after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush pledged to support democratic movements “around the world, including the Islamic world.”²⁶ This commitment to democracy in the Middle East was demonstrated again in his 2006 State of the Union address, in which he stated that “The United States... supports democratic reform across the broader Middle East.”²⁷

²³ Madeleine Albright, ‘A Realistic Idealism...’, *Washington Post*, 8 May 2006.

²⁴ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, Ch VIII, 36.

²⁵ President George W. Bush, First Term Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., 20 January 2001.

²⁶ President George W. Bush, 2002 State of the Union address, Washington, D.C., 29 January 2002.

²⁷ President George W. Bush, 2006 State of the Union address, Washington, D.C., 31 January 2006.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has spoken often of the importance of democracy in U.S. policy. In 2005, she rejected *realpolitik* in favour of a more ideological approach in the Middle East, asserting that for 60 years the United States had sought stability at the expense of democracy and achieved neither. She went on: “Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people.”²⁸

These policy statements are reflected in the 2006 *National Security Strategy*. The first chapter provides a concise summary of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ for foreign relations:

It is the policy of the United States to...support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world...the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. [Our goal] is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.²⁹

Each sentence makes an important point. The first pledges US support for democratic movements “in every nation and culture.” The second re-sets the balance between *realpolitik* and ideology in favour of the latter, reflecting precisely the line taken by the President and the Secretary of State in their previous policy speeches. Correspondingly, the third establishes democracy as the goal of US statecraft. The fourth links the spread of democracy to the security of the United States and her people.

DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY

President Bush suggested a close relationship between democracy-promotion and security in his Second Term Inaugural Address in 2005:

²⁸ Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State, speaking at the American University in Cairo, Egypt, 20 Jun 05.

²⁹ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, Ch I, 1.

...The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands...America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one...Advancing [democratic] ideals...is the urgent requirement of our nation's security... So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.³⁰

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated the link between democracy and security in Cairo in June 2005, stating that "Freedom and democracy are the only ideas powerful enough to overcome hatred, and division, and violence."³¹ She returned to the same theme in October 2006, when she stated that "the President believes, and I believe, that our strategic interests and our interests in democracy are one and the same."³²

The 2006 *National Security Strategy* reflected these ideas. It observed that "states that are governed well are most inclined to behave well" and warned potential transgressors that "while we do not seek to dictate to other states the choices they make...we also must hedge appropriately in case states choose unwisely."³³

The September 2006 report *9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges* reinforced the link between democracy and security, stating that "...democracies exercise effective sovereignty and maintain order within their own borders [and] are the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism."³⁴ British Prime Minister Tony Blair agreed at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on 1 August 2006, in what Downing Street's website called "a major foreign policy speech on the Middle East." He advocated a "complete renaissance" in Western foreign policy to defeat reactionary Islam. During questions he explained that:

³⁰ President George W. Bush, Second Term Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., 20 January 2005.

³¹ Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice speaking at the American University in Cairo, Egypt, 20 June 2005.

³² Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice speaking to the print media in Cairo on 3 October 2006, accessed at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/73555.htm> on 23 November 2006.

³³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, Ch VIII, 36.

³⁴ *9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges*, September 2006.

...there are no stable relationships in the long term unless there is progress towards democracy and freedom...in other words the idea that countries that are governed by either secular or religious dictatorships provide a solid basis for progress...is just wrong. ...it is only through the spread of liberty, and democracy, and the rule of law and basic respect for human rights that we will get peace and security.³⁵

The United States' national strategic endstates for the campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan require the establishment of functioning and secure democracies. In his 2007 State of the Union speech, President Bush stated that "Our goal in Afghanistan is to help the people of that country to defeat the terrorists and establish a stable, moderate, and democratic state," accepting that "for some that may seem like an impossible task."³⁶ The Iraq Strategy Review of early 2007 asserted that "The Freedom Agenda is advanced by the survival and strengthening of Iraq's democratic institutions."³⁷

DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ

Iraq remains close to the heart of the Administration's Middle East policy and provides a useful case study on the relationship between ideology and realism in US foreign policy. In his 2006 State of the Union speech, President Bush lauded "the dramatic progress of a new democracy" in Iraq, which "in less than three years...has gone from dictatorship to liberation, to sovereignty, to a constitution, to national elections."³⁸ However, consensus on what to do next remains elusive.

In late 2006, General John Abizaid, then Commander CENTCOM, endured fierce questioning on the Iraq campaign by the Senate's Armed Services Committee. Senator

³⁵ British Prime Minister Tony Blair's Speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 1 August 2006.

³⁶ President Bush speaking on progress in Afghanistan in Washington, D.C. on 15 February 2007, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070215-1.html> on 25 February 2007.

³⁷ *Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review*, National Security Council summary briefing slides, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf> on 25 February 2007.

³⁸ President George W Bush in his 2006 State of the Union Address, Washington DC, 31 January 2006, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060131-10.html> on 4 November 2006.

John S. McCain remarked that “I regret deeply that you seem to think that the status quo and the rate of progress we’re making is acceptable. I think most Americans do not.”³⁹

A November 2006 article in *The National Interest* by General Tommy Franks and six other respected commentators agreed that the Bush Administration’s goal of establishing a functioning Western democracy in Iraq was over-ambitious and counterproductive.⁴⁰ Franks warned that preoccupation with democracy in Iraq was a “blind alley,” while Peter Charles Choharis proposed five “modest” political milestones in contrast to “the Bush Administration’s utopian rhetoric about Iraqi democracy.” He asserted that his formula offered a “chance of peace and stability” while fearing the alternative of “a human tragedy that haunts the United States for years to come.”

The Middle Eastern public appears to be equally pessimistic. A 2004 Anwar Sadat/Zogby survey found that only 3% of respondents in Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt believed that Iraqi people were better off than before the war.⁴¹ A Pew survey in 2006 found that just 31% of respondents in Pakistan, Jordan, Indonesia, Egypt, and Turkey believed that democracy would succeed in Iraq.⁴²

Events moved apace at the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007. On 6 December 2006, the Iraq Study Group issued its report, which called for a “new diplomatic

³⁹ ‘Pentagon May Suggest Short-Term Buildup Leading to Iraq Exit’, *The Washington Post*, 20 November 2006, accessed at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/19/AR2006111901249.html> on 27 November 2006.

⁴⁰ Tommy Franks, Stephen Biddle, Peter Charles Choharis, John M. Owen IV, Daniel Pipes, Gary Rosen and Dov S. Zakheim, ‘Is This Victory?’ in *The National Interest Online*, 10 November 2006, accessed at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=12988> on 26 November 2006.

⁴¹ Public Opinion Poll conducted jointly by the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and Zogby International: ‘Arab Attitudes Towards Political and Social Issues, Foreign Policy and the Media’, May 2004, 2.

⁴² The Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey ‘America’s Image Slips, but Allies Share US Concerns over Iran, Hamas’, released 13 June 2006, 14.

offensive” that included engagement with Iran and Syria, and a focus on building Iraqi capacity to enable the “responsible” withdrawal of U.S. troops.⁴³

President Bush released his own revised strategy for Iraq on 10 January 2007, stating that the strategy would demand more of Iraq's government while providing reinforcements to stretched U.S. forces.⁴⁴ The goal was “a democratic Iraq that upholds the rule of law, respects the rights of its people, provides them security, and is an ally in the war on terror.”⁴⁵

The new strategy promised to “diversify political and economic efforts” and to “situate the strategy in a regional approach.” It was sub-divided into four areas: Security, Political, Economic and Regional. The political measures, including partnerships with community leaders and political cooperation at the local and national levels, lacked the utopianism of previous strategies. The Regional agenda recommended the establishment of a regional forum to assist in Iraq’s recovery, engagement with *Arab* neighbours (thus excluding Iran) and countering “negative foreign activity” in Iraq (which pointed particularly at Iran). The big news story was an increase in force levels and a renewed effort to regain control of Baghdad, but a more striking aspect of the new strategy was a conspicuous move towards a more *realist* approach, notwithstanding its maintenance of a hard line on Iran and Syria. The White House fact sheet did not use the word ‘democracy’ once.

⁴³ James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs; and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, Alan K. Simpson, *The Iraq Study Group Report*, Vintage Books, Random House Inc, New York, December 2006.

⁴⁴ White House Fact Sheet *The New Way Forward in Iraq*, 10 January 2007, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-3.html> on 27 February 2007.

⁴⁵ President George W. Bush in his 2007 State of the Union Address in Washington D.C. on 23 January 2007, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070123-2.html> on 24 Feb 2007.

DEMOCRATIZATION INITIATIVES

The United States-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)

The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was launched in December 2002 by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who stated that it would be “a bridge between the United States and the Middle East...that spans the hope gap with energy, ideas, and funding...a concrete demonstration of our commitment to human dignity in the Middle East.”⁴⁶ MEPI consists of four pillars: Economic, Education, Women’s Empowerment and Democracy. (Their goals are shown in Appendix B, Table B2.)

Many early criticisms of MEPI have been addressed. The initial pledge of \$29 million was considered derisory by many, but close to \$300 million had been committed by the end of the 2005 fiscal year. The State Department has acknowledged that “different societies will find forms of democracy that work for them” and now emphasizes MEPI’s role in supporting “*indigenous* [author’s emphasis] calls for enduring change.” Addressing another criticism, it stated that “MEPI does not provide direct economic support to governments. Instead, [it supports] organizations...working to bring about structural and institutional reform in their own countries.”⁴⁷

The Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative

The Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative was launched at the G8 Summit of June 2004. (The White House’s fact sheet in Appendix C, Figure C2.)

⁴⁶ Secretary of State Colin Powell speaking about the launch of MEPI in December 2002, accessed at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/WMI180.cfm> on 3 February 2007.

⁴⁷ ‘The Middle East Partnership Initiative Story’, accessed on the State Department website at <http://mepi.state.gov/outreach/index.htm> on 10 March 2007.

The launch followed the abandonment of the Bush Administration's ambitious Greater Middle East Plan in response to widespread criticism,⁴⁸ and also reflected the emergence of a number of Arab reform initiatives in the first half of 2004. Of note, the January 2004 Sana'a Declaration called for an end to "the occupation of Arab territories" and proposed an "Arab Democratic Dialogue Forum."⁴⁹ The March 2004 Alexandria Statement was another positive step, urging Arab governments to promote reform and demanded "a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, respect for the territorial integrity of Iraq, and the transformation of the Middle East into an area free of weapons of mass destruction."⁵⁰ Although the May 2004 Arab League summit in Tunisia produced little of substance, the inaugural BMENA meeting seven months later was relatively fruitful, pledging of \$60 million for reform initiatives.

SEEKING BIPOLAR SIMPLICITY

The Bush Administration has sought to create Cold War-like bipolarity in the post-9/11 world. The benchmarks against which other countries have been judged are their stance on transnational terrorism and other global security issues such as WMD proliferation, and their advancement of democracy.

The first chapter of the 2006 *National Security Strategy* asserted that "the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them" and advised that the advancement of democracy was "the surest way...to cement

⁴⁸ Regional players objected to the apparent imposition of a programme of reform by external powers. President Mubarak of Egypt told journalists that "we hear about these initiatives as if the region and its states do not exist, as if they had no sovereignty over their land."

⁴⁹ The Sana'a Declaration is at <http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/sanaa-declaration-html.htm>.

⁵⁰ The Alexandria Statement is at <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/reform/alex2004.htm>.

close relations with the United States.”⁵¹ Other countries’ relations with the United States would depend on their behaviour and democratic credentials.

The Bush Administration also differentiates according to countries’ decisions regarding the War on Terror. President Bush told the world on 20 September 2001 that “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”⁵² and reiterated his stance at a news conference on 6 November 2001, stating that “it’s going to be important for nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity...in the fight against terror.”⁵³

Iran and the Axis of Evil

Associated with the “with us or against us” view is the definition of an “Axis of Evil.” President Bush grouped Iran, Iraq and North Korea in an Axis of Evil in his 2002 State of the Union Address⁵⁴ and Undersecretary of State John Bolton later added Libya, Syria and Cuba.⁵⁵ Linked to the categorization was rejection of diplomatic engagement with such ‘rogue states’, seemingly on the basis that it would signal endorsement.

Iran, an increasingly important player in the Middle East, has been similarly reluctant to talk to the United States. One Iranian official is quoted as saying that “you don’t negotiate with someone who wants to overthrow you,” while another feared that dialogue with the United States would bring only “humiliation and intimidation.”⁵⁶ In

⁵¹ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, Ch VII, 36.

⁵² President Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 September 2001, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> on 18 November 2006.

⁵³ President George W. Bush speaking with President Jacques Chirac at the White House on 6 November 2001. Accessed at <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/ret.bush.coalition/index.html> on 23 Nov 2006.

⁵⁴ President George W. Bush, 2002 State of the Union address, Washington, D.C., 29 January 2002.

⁵⁵ John R Bolton, ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction’, at the Heritage Foundation, 6 May 2002, accessed at <http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/9962.htm> on 5 Nov 2006.

⁵⁶ David Ignatius, ‘Baker Ex Machina’, *The Washington Post*, 15 November 2006.

his November 2006 Guildhall world affairs speech, Tony Blair acknowledged Iran's "genuine, if entirely misplaced fear, that the US seeks a military solution in Iran."⁵⁷

There have been calls for renewed engagement with Iran. Stephen Biddle suggested that regional diplomacy in the Middle East could provide "real bargaining leverage, which we lack today." In the same article, John Owen saw Iran as a key element of the Iraqi jigsaw and mused unenthusiastically about diplomatic engagement. He concluded "We are losing, Iran is winning, and we are enemies. One of those three facts must change."⁵⁸

The Iraq Study Group, led by Lee Hamilton and former Secretary of State James Baker, advocated dialogue with Iran and Syria in order to bring their influence to bear in Iraq.

Tony Blair agreed, declaring that the West should:

...offer Iran a clear strategic choice: they help the MEPP [Middle East Peace Process] not hinder it; they stop supporting terrorism in Lebanon or Iraq; and they abide by, not flout, their international obligations. In that case, a new partnership is possible. Or alternatively they face the consequences of not doing so: isolation.⁵⁹

"We Are At War"

The last part of the bipolar world-model is the assertion that the United States is at war. Following the 9/11 attacks, President Bush told reporters at Camp David that "We're at war" on 15 September 2001 and reiterated that "Freedom and fear are at war" in his speech to Congress on 20 September 2001.^{60, 61} This message has been reinforced

⁵⁷ British Prime Minister Tony Blair's 13 November 2006 world affairs speech at the Guildhall, London.

⁵⁸ Tommy Franks, Stephen Biddle, Peter Charles Choharis, John M. Owen IV, Daniel Pipes, Gary Rosen and Dov S. Zakheim, 'Is This Victory?' in *The National Interest Online*, 10 November 2006, at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=12988> on 26 Nov 06.

⁵⁹ British Prime Minister Tony Blair speaking in his annual address on world affairs to the Lord Mayor's Banquet at the Guildhall in London on 13 November 2006, accessed at Downing Street's official website <http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10409.asp> on 25 November 2006. (Britain's Prime Minister traditionally uses the Guildhall speech to outline his foreign policy vision)

⁶⁰ President Bush speaking to reporters at Camp David on 15 September 2001, accessed at CNN.com: <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/15/bush.terrorism/> on 23 November 2006.

periodically in the years since 9/11. When unveiling new Secretary of Defence Robert Gates late in 2006, President Bush stated again that “America remains a nation at war.”⁶²

CONCLUSION

The Bush Doctrine consists of three elements – security, a black-and-white view of the post-9/11 world, and the promotion of democracy – which combine in an approach that is seen increasingly as imperious and unrealistic. In particular, the Administration has adopted a utopian, all-or-nothing approach to the promotion of constitutional democracy. However, implementing democracy in non-Western cultures is difficult, particularly in complex, volatile situations like that in Iraq. Furthermore, the conflation of the democracy and security imperatives in U.S. policy creates uncertainty over which comes first. While logic and experience suggest that security is a precursor for electoral democracy, the Administration’s rhetoric has often suggested the opposite. Finally, the Administration’s “with us or against us” approach, while understandable, does not help. Many reject such a simplistic view, as France and Germany demonstrated in 2003.

Progress is being made. MEPI and BMENA are yielding tangible benefits and President Bush’s new strategy for Iraq, which includes a range of measures at local, national and regional levels, is more realistic than previous iterations. Even so, the U.S. Middle Eastern agenda requires a more comprehensive revision. The next chapter will suggest that policymakers could begin this revision by decomposing democracy into a set of more fundamental concepts that are of more obvious relevance in the Middle East.

⁶¹ President George W Bush, Address to Congress and the American People, 20 September 2001, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> on 18 November 2006.

⁶² President George W. Bush, appointing Dr Robert Gates as Secretary of Defence on 8 November 2006, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061108-4.html> on 23 November 2006.

CHAPTER 4 - DEMOCRACY

INTRODUCTION

In a constitutional sense, democracy is fundamentally “a form of government...in which the powers of the majority are exercised within a framework of constitutional restraints...this is known as liberal or constitutional democracy.”⁶³ The American Declaration of Independence (1776) described constitutional democracy thus: “...it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish [their government], and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness...”⁶⁴

However, social and political conditions in the Middle East demand the use of a more granular description of democracy. Based on the work of noted theorists and some of President Bush’s own statements, this chapter explains a set of fundamental democratic values that are meaningful, and offer things of discernable value, to people in the Middle East. These key concepts are: consent-based government; the rule of law; freedom; human rights and equality; and sovereignty and responsibility.

CONSENT-BASED GOVERNMENT

Consent-based government requires that a government is elected, removed and held accountable by the population. Chapter II of the U.S. *National Security Strategy* of 2006 stressed the accountability of government, observing that “Elections are the most visible

⁶³ Encyclopaedia Britannica, Australian Edition, 2003.

⁶⁴ *The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America*, Cato Institute, Washington DC, 1998.

sign of a free society.”⁶⁵ Consent-based government also requires independent political and civil institutions and genuinely competitive elections. The *National Security Strategy* emphasizes the importance of such institutions, stating that:

Effective democracy...requires institutions that can protect individual liberty and ensure that the government is responsive and accountable to its citizens. There must be an independent media to inform the public and facilitate the free exchange of ideas. There must be political associations and political parties that can freely compete.

William Ebenstein, Alan Ebenstein and Edwin Fogelman identified the *instrumental nature of the state* among eight criteria for a democratic society proposed in their book *Today's Isms*.⁶⁶ (The full set of criteria is shown in Appendix B, Table B3.) In other words, the state (and thus the government) must not be the highest authority, but rather an instrument of the people. Larry Diamond, another influential theorist, included *a functioning legislature* among six required elements of a democratic system in his book *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*.⁶⁷ This element linked constitutional government to Diamond's principal preoccupation, the rule of law.

THE RULE OF LAW

The *rule of law* requires that the legal process is free from political control or interference. Its fundamental requirements are a coherent and accepted body of law, law enforcement institutions that are apolitical and accountable, and a judiciary that is independent of political control. Ebenstein and Fogelman agreed, identifying *a law*

⁶⁵ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, Ch II – ‘Explaining the Goal: Promoting Effective Democracies’, p 4-5.

⁶⁶ Ebenstein A, Ebenstein W and Fogelman, Edwin. *Today's Isms: Socialism, Capitalism, Fascism, Communism, and Libertarianism (11th Edition)*, New Jersey: Prentiss-Hall, Inc, 1999, p 170-178.

⁶⁷ Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, 10-13.

behind the law as a key democratic value. The law must govern relations between the state, society and individuals, a concept that is prominent in both the American Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution.⁶⁸

Larry Diamond also emphasized the rule of law, identifying three required elements of a democratic system as an *independent judiciary*; the *rule of law and due legal process*; and *military and security establishments that are apolitical and constitutionalist*.⁶⁹ President Bush agreed in the 2006 *National Security Strategy*,⁷⁰ which stated that “Effective democracies...protect independent and impartial systems of justice, punish crime, embrace the rule of law, and resist corruption... reinforced by an independent judiciary, a professional legal establishment, and an honest and competent police force.”

Thus there is consensus on the importance of the rule of law, which reduces the power of the state and limits its capacity for excess. Unsurprisingly, it is a particularly difficult pill for an undemocratic regime to swallow.

FREEDOM

‘Freedom’ is the most overused, yet perhaps the most important, word in any discussion of democracy. It is used here to describe a range of important individual rights, including freedom of religion, speech, association, movement and trade.

⁶⁸ Ebenstein A, Ebenstein W and Fogelman, Edwin. *Today’s Isms*.

⁶⁹ Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, 10-13.

⁷⁰ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, Ch II – ‘Explaining the Goal: Promoting Effective Democracies’, p 4-5.

Again, influential theorists are in agreement. Ebenstein and Fogelman included three components of a free society in their set of criteria: *rational empiricism*, whereby people are free to seek information, to judge the truth and to express diverse opinions; *voluntarism*, which means freedom of association; and *discussion and consent in human relations*.⁷¹ Larry Diamond identified *freedom of expression, association, and media* amongst his elements of a democratic societal model.⁷² The 2006 *National Security Strategy* agrees, stating that effective democracies safeguard “freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press...[and] the family, religious communities, voluntary associations, private property, independent business, and a market economy.”⁷³

Freedom is a difficult subject because societies exist at neither extreme. Even in countries that merited perfect scores in Freedom House’s 2007 *Comparative Measures of Freedom* survey,⁷⁴ people are constrained in ways that some regard as unfair and illiberal. Anarchy to one man is freedom to another. Conversely, in the countries awarded the worst scores,⁷⁵ people have certain elemental freedoms (such as freedom of thought) that cannot be denied by an illiberal society. Thus, the assessment of freedom in other countries is a subjective and imprecise business – a problem for a country that places a *freedom agenda* at the heart of its foreign policy.

⁷¹ Ebenstein A, Ebenstein W and Fogelman, Edwin. *Today’s Isms*.

⁷² Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, 10-13.

⁷³ The 2006 U.S. *National Security Strategy*, Chapter II, 4.

⁷⁴ Freedom House paper *Freedom in the World 2007, Selected Data From Freedom House’s Annual Global Survey Of Political Rights And Civil Liberties*, accessed at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fw07_charts.pdf on 23 February 2007. Freedom House categorizes countries as Free, Partly Free or Not Free, basing its assessment on questions in two categories: political rights and civil liberties (the latter including the key area of human rights).

⁷⁵ Freedom House awards the worst possible scores of 7 and 7 to: Burma, Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY

The importance of human rights is acknowledged almost universally, even where people are suspicious of ‘Western democracy’. Few would disagree that the importance of human rights transcends different religions, cultures and systems of government.

The areas targeted by Human Rights Watch⁷⁶ comprise a useful checklist of issues that are relevant to the lives of people from all cultures and religions. The list, which is set out in full in Appendix B, Table B4, includes Children’s Rights, Prison Conditions and the Treatment of Prisoners, Refugees, Religious Freedom, Torture and Abuse and Women’s Rights. Although Human Rights Watch doubts the United States’ credentials in the realm of human rights, the 2006 *National Security Strategy* was unequivocal on their importance. It promised that the United States would employ “the full array of political, economic, diplomatic and other tools” in defence of human rights.⁷⁷

Ebenstein and Fogelman emphasized the importance of human rights and equality in two of their criteria: *Equality of all human beings* and *Emphasis on the individual*, while Larry Diamond identified the *protection of human and civil rights*.

Women’s Rights

Women’s rights are a significant issue in the Middle East. Human Rights Watch states that:

⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch states on its website that its role is to “prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice” and promises to “investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable [and] challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law.” Accessed at <http://hrw.org/about/> on 23 February 2007.

⁷⁷ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, Ch II – ‘Explaining the Goal: Promoting Effective Democracies’, p 6-7.

Millions of women throughout the world [lack] fundamental human rights... Combatants and their sympathizers in conflicts, such as those in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, and Rwanda, have raped women as a weapon of war with near complete impunity. Men in Pakistan, South Africa, Peru, Russia, and Uzbekistan beat women in the home at astounding rates... Women in Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia face government-sponsored discrimination that renders them unequal before the law - including discriminatory family codes that take away women's legal authority and place it in the hands of male family members - and restricts women's participation in public life. Abuses against women are relentless, systematic, and widely tolerated, if not explicitly condoned. Violence and discrimination against women are global social epidemics...⁷⁸

Women's rights also constitute one of the four pillars of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). According to its website, the State Department "supports local NGOs and women reformers across the Middle East and North Africa in their effort to achieve full participation in society," and "aims to address the cultural, legal, regulatory, economic, and political barriers that women encounter in their daily lives."⁷⁹

SOVEREIGNTY AND RESPONSIBILITY

The concepts of *sovereignty* and *responsibility* are less obvious, but nonetheless important. Sovereignty over property and land is linked to responsibility for what takes place in the sovereign area. Consideration of these topics will be of particular value in a discussion that has a religious element. Where lies sovereignty? Is it earthly or divine, religious or secular? To what or to whom is an individual responsible, and at what point is the individual no longer responsible for what he or she does? The next chapter begins to address these questions. For its part, the Bush Administration insists that sovereignty is crucial. The 2006 *National Security Strategy* asserted that "Effective democracies... exercise effective sovereignty and maintain order within their own borders."

⁷⁸ Human Rights Watch, Women's Rights, accessed at <http://www.hrw.org/women/> on 24 February 2007.

⁷⁹ Comments on the Women's Pillar of MEPI, accessed on the State Department's website at <http://mepi.state.gov/c10127.htm> on 24 February 2007.

CONCLUSION

Democracy is too often treated simplistically as a system of government and described in language that is high-handed and difficult to understand for people suffering social and economic deprivation in undemocratic countries. However, it is possible to derive a set of more fundamental and widely-applicable democratic values: consent-based government; the rule of law; freedom; human rights and equality; and sovereignty and responsibility.

These criteria will provide a framework for discussion on the compatibility of democracy and Islam, and the U.S. policy agenda in the Middle East. They begin to illuminate areas in foreign policy and national strategy where there is tension between democratic ideology and the pursuit of national interests. That tension was encapsulated in another of the elements identified by Ebenstein and Fogelman: *emphasis on the means employed*. They meant that the methods employed in pursuit of a desired outcome must be reasonable, regardless of the outcome's perceived importance. In other words, the pursuit of national interests must be subject to restraints. This exposes tension between not two, but three influences in foreign policy: realism, ideology *and ethics*.

The following chapter will determine whether there is any ideological obstacle to the reconciliation of Western and Islamic societies. It will do so by assessing the compatibility of the fundamental democratic values described above with Islamic theology. These insights are needed to inform the development of effective U.S. policy and strategies in the Middle East.

CHAPTER 5 – COMPETING IDEOLOGIES

INTRODUCTION

It has been shown that the relationship between the Western and Islamic worlds is volatile and complex. The United States' preoccupation with the Middle East and the importance of democracy in her foreign policy demand a careful consideration of the applicability of democratic values to Islamic countries.

In the previous chapter, democracy was decomposed into basic components: consent-based government, the rule of law, freedom, human rights and equality, and sovereignty and responsibility. This chapter will consider Islamic theology in relation to each of these components, seeking to determine whether there is a significant ideological or theological impediment to Middle Eastern democratization.

The *Quran*⁸⁰ was used as the source of Islamic teachings, notwithstanding the inevitable weakness of a non-Muslim's analysis. *Hadith*⁸¹ and other Islamic writings were not used because it is hard to judge their reliability and relative importance.

CONSENT-BASED GOVERNMENT

The Quran permits the establishment of government in Muslim societies. Verse 3:26 enjoins "O Allah...Thou givest power to whom Thou pleasest, and Thou strippest

⁸⁰ All Quranic quotes are taken from the widely accepted Yusuf Ali translation. Sources included *The Qur'an Translation* by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an Inc, New York, March 2006, and two online sources: <http://www.harunyahya.com> and <http://www.sabawoon.com>.

⁸¹ *Hadith* are traditions derived from things that the Prophet Mohammed is alleged to have said or done. They are an important element of Sharia. The plural is sometimes expressed 'ahadith', but here the word *Hadith* is used here as singular or plural.

off power from whom Thou please” and 6:165 advises that “It is He who hath made you (His) agents...He hath raised you in ranks, some above others.” These injunctions are not wholly out of step with Western thinking: the American Declaration of Independence stated that: “all men are...endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights [and] to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men...”⁸² However, while democratic governments derive their power ultimately “from the consent of the governed,”⁸³ Islamic theology directs that exercising power requires the consent of God.

Suggestions that Islamic teachings require the rule of *a single* leader, and that democratic government is thus fundamentally ‘un-Islamic’, are rejected by many Islamists. South Asian Islamist leader Abu al-Ala Mawdudi asserts in his book *The Islamic Way of Life* that “The authority of the caliphate⁸⁴ is bestowed on the entire group of people, the community as a whole...This is the point where democracy begins in Islam. Every person in an Islamic society enjoys the rights and powers of the caliphate...”⁸⁵ Sudanese pro-democracy intellectual Dr. Abdelwahab El-Affendi agreed:

No Muslim questions the sovereignty of God or the rule of Shari’ah. However, most Muslims do (and did) have misgivings about any claims by one person that he is sovereign. The sovereignty of one man contradicts the sovereignty of God, for all men are equal in front of God. . . . Blind obedience to one-man rule is contrary to Islam.⁸⁶

John L. Esposito and John O. Voll agree that Islam is not fundamentally incompatible with democratic government and identify *Political Islam* as the vehicle that

⁸² *The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America*, Cato Institute, Washington DC, 1998.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ The *Caliph* is the title for the leader of the Islamic *Ummah*, or global Islamic nation. It is a transliterated version of the Arabic word *Khalifah*, which means ‘successor’ or ‘representative’.

⁸⁵ Quoted from the article ‘Islam and Democracy’ by John L Esposito and John O Voll in *Humanities* Volume 22/Number 6, November/December 2001..

⁸⁶ Dr. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, ‘The Democratic Deficit in the Muslim World’, accessed at <http://ifid-islam21.blogspot.com/search/label/Pluralism%20and%20Civil%20Society> on 26 February 2007.

might reconcile the two. In their article *Islam and Democracy*, they suggested that the concept of *tawhid*, the oneness of God, is key. Thus “the separation of religion from politics creates a spiritual vacuum in the public arena and opens the way for political systems that have no sense of moral values.”⁸⁷ Tunisian Islamist leader and political exile Rashid Ghanoushi also agreed:

If by democracy is meant the liberal model of government prevailing in the West, a system under which the people freely choose their representatives and leaders, in which there is an alternation of power, as well as all freedoms and human rights for the public, then Muslims will find nothing in their religion to oppose democracy...⁸⁸

Thus, a number of academics believe that Islamic teachings can be reconciled with democratic government, perhaps through Political Islam. The progress of successful Muslim democracies, such as those in Turkey and Malaysia, further reinforce this view.

THE RULE OF LAW

Islamic law, or *Sharia*, is based on the Quran, Hadith,⁸⁹ and, to a lesser extent, *fiqh* (consensus on Islamic jurisprudence) and *Qiyas* (reasoning, especially by analogy, to deal with problems for which there are no clear rules). It differs from Western legal systems in a number of respects. Encyclopaedia Britannica states that “the scope of the Sharia is much wider...[it] is not merely a system of law, but a comprehensive code of behaviour that embraces both private and public activities” and points out that:

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Quoted from the article ‘Islam and Democracy’ by John L Esposito and John O Voll in *Humanities* Volume 22/Number 6, November/December 2001.

⁸⁹ *Hadith* are problematic in the context of liberal democracy, and indeed of Islamic jurisprudence. More than 99% of the 700,000 Hadith generated after the death of Mohammed were reckoned to be false. At the beginning of his seminal collection of Hadith, Imam Bukhari noted that out of nearly 600,000 Hadith known to him, he had been able to authenticate only 7397. Much of the myth, superstition and corrosive dogma that afflict modern Islam has grown out of the perpetuation of false Hadith.

With the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, communication of the divine will to man [ostensibly] ceased so that the terms of the divine revelation were henceforth fixed and immutable. When, therefore,...this source material was held to be complete...in the medieval legal manuals, Sharia law became...rigid and static...⁹⁰

Although Islam and democracy co-exist in relative harmony in parts of the Muslim world, democracy and Sharia are uncomfortable bedfellows. In 1998 the Turkish Constitutional Court proscribed the Refah (Welfare) Party, which sought the imposition of Sharia in Turkey. In 2004 the European Court of Human Rights ruled on the case:

...the Court found that sharia was incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy ...It considered that sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place in it. According to the Court, it was difficult to declare one's respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, which clearly diverged from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervened in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts.⁹¹

These were important rulings – not least because the first was delivered in a Muslim country. In his review of Ali Kahn's book *A Theory of Universal Democracy*, Christian Peppan wrote: "It is interesting to note here that the Constitutional Court of Turkey – a country whose population is overwhelmingly Muslim – has unequivocally declared...that the rules of Sharia were incompatible with a democratic regime."^{92,93}

It appears to be difficult to reconcile Sharia with liberal democracy. Sharia, having originated in the 7th-10th Centuries, is largely unresponsive to the needs of modern

⁹⁰ *Encyclopaedia Britannica Deluxe Edition*, Encyclopaedia Britannica Australia, 2003.

⁹¹ Transcript of a speech by Mr Luzius Wildhaber, President of the European Court of Human Rights, at a hearing of the Court on 22 January 2004, 2.

⁹² Christian Peppan, Book Review of Professor Ali Kahn's 'A Theory of Universal Democracy', *The European Journal of International Law*, Vol 15 No 1, 2004, 215.

⁹³ Although Turkey is indeed "overwhelmingly Muslim" as Peppan pointed out, the Turkish Constitution asserts that Turkey is a *secular* and *democratic* republic in which sovereignty rests ultimately with the people. Article 4 of the Turkish Constitution identifies the founding principles of the Republic as: secularism, social equality, equality before the law, republican government and "the indivisibility of the Republic and of the Turkish Nation," and forbids the modification of these principles.

society. This is the antithesis of the Western ideal of a legal system that is responsive to the needs of society. It reinforces the inequality of women, prescribes inhumane punishments and is excessively pervasive in public life. Local conditions and differences in perspective are key and inconsistent interpretations provide ample room for injustice.

FREEDOM

The Quran supports a number of basic freedoms. Freedom of assembly and migration are permitted by Verse 4:71, which enjoins “Take your precautions, and either go forth in parties or go forth all together,” while Verse 4:100 promises that “He who forsakes his home in the cause of Allah” will find “many a refuge [and] comforts.”

The Quran also encourages free trade, urging believers in 4:29 to “Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities: But let there be amongst you Traffic and trade by mutual good-will...”. However, 2:275 forbids usury (charging interest) warning that “Those who devour usury will not stand,” because “Allah hath...forbidden usury.”

The Quran is clear on the right of Muslims to take up arms to free themselves from oppression. Verses 2:190-193 and 4:75 set out a doctrine for the defence of Muslim societies, including instructions that there must “be no hostility except to those who practise oppression” and that defenders must not “transgress limits.” The following verses underline Muslims’ obligation to “fight in the cause of Allah” when faced with aggression or oppression and are highly relevant in today’s strategic environment.

2:190-193 Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors. And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have Turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter...But if they cease, Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. And fight them on

until there is no more Tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah. But if they cease, Let there be no hostility except to those who practise oppression.

4:75 And why should ye not fight in the cause of Allah and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated (and oppressed)?- Men, women, and children, whose cry is: “Our Lord! Rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from thee one who will protect; and raise for us from thee one who will help!”

These themes emerge often in the rhetoric of senior Islamic radical leaders. In his *Fatwah Against Jews and Crusaders* of 23 February 1998, Usama bin Laden suggested that the “...Arabian Peninsula has never...been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations”. Citing Verses 2:193 and 4:75, he went on to command:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies...is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it...⁹⁴

Democratic and Islamic ideologies promote fundamentally different concepts of freedom. The former emphasizes the freedom *of the individual*, while the latter focuses on the well-being, freedom and harmony of the Muslim *community*. Again, the Quran permits a variety of interpretations.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY

The issues of human rights and equality are fundamental. Many modern societies struggle to bind different cultural, ethnic and religious groups under a common national banner; Muslim societies are not unique in this regard. The Quran does support cultural tolerance to a degree, but Islamic teachings do not accord with Western notions of

⁹⁴ PBS Frontline website <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/edicts.html>.

equality. In the modern world, an increasing number of radicalized Muslims proclaim the superiority of their religion and culture, and their lack of regard for others.

Fairness and Charity

Many Quranic verses emphasize fairness and charity *within* Muslim society. Verse 2:215 promotes charity “for parents and kindred and orphans and those in want and for wayfarers,” while 2:271 advises that “if ye disclose (acts of) charity, even so it is well, but if ye conceal them, and make them reach those (really) in need, that is best for you...” Justice is also emphasized. 4:135 enjoins believers to “...Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for Allah can best protect both...”

Several Quranic verses stress the need for temperance in human relations. 17:53 cautions that “Satan doth sow dissensions among [you]” and 39:18 warns that “Allah loveth not any arrogant boaster”. 49:11-13 provide more extensive guidance, exhorting Muslim men and women not to “laugh at others...Nor defame nor be sarcastic to each other” and reflecting that “We...made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other)....”

Women

Perhaps surprisingly, the Quran’s message on women is mixed. 3:195 seems to support the essential equality of men and women, asserting their equal entitlement to employment: “I never fail to reward any worker among you for any work you do, be you

male or female—you are equal to one another...” Several other verses avoid differentiating between the genders.

However, Verse 4.3 allows men to “Marry women of your choice, Two or three or four;” but suggests that a man should stick with one if he is unable “to deal justly” with more. Men who “fear disloyalty and ill-conduct” by their women are advised by 4:34 to “admonish them...refuse to share their beds, (And last) beat them,” until they “return to obedience.” Women who “fornicate” are required by 4:3 to be detained “until death releases them or Allah ordains another procedure.” The inheritance law prescribed by 4:11 grants to a male child “a portion equal to that of two females.”

Christians, Jews and Disbelievers

The Quran’s perspective on non-Muslims is of great significance in today’s strategic environment. It portrays a world in which Muslims, Christians and Jews – the ‘People of the Book’ – existed in relative harmony. Verse 29:46 emphasizes the fundamental connection of the three monotheistic religions, urging “dispute ye not with the People of the Book...but say, “...Our Allah and your Allah is one; and it is to Him we bow.”” However, 5:51 advises “take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors... [because] They are but friends and protectors to each other.” 9.29 demands that Christians and Jews must submit to Muslims and pay the *Jizya*⁹⁵:

9:29 Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day...nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.

⁹⁵ Under Islamic law, *Jizya* is a tax imposed on non-Muslims in exchange for being allowed to practice their own faith.

The terms ‘disbelievers’ and ‘unbelievers’ appear to apply generally to pagans, but ‘unbelief’ is also attributed to People of the Book in Verse 4:46, which deals with Jews and concludes “but Allah hath cursed them for their Unbelief...” Verse 2:98 reveals God’s enmity towards “those who reject Faith”, who, according to 8:55, are “the worst of beasts in the sight of Allah”. Many verses (2:90, 2:104, 4:37, 4:151...) state that they will be subjected to severe punishment *by God*, but a few deal specifically with unbelievers punishment by Muslims themselves. Verse 9:5 does so, enjoining Muslims to “...fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them”, but also urges “if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them...”.

SOVEREIGNTY AND RESPONSIBILITY

Sovereignty

The Bush Administration considers sovereignty to be a pre-requisite for democracy. This view of sovereignty requires that countries take responsibility for what crosses their borders in both directions, and for what happens internally. Ideally, this approach counters trans-national terrorism while creating space for democratic and civil institutions to operate unimpeded. It also runs counter to the Islamic fundamentalist notion of a single Islamic *Caliphate* spanning North Africa, the Middle East and southern Asia. The Quran underlines the ultimate sovereignty of God and has no concept of the state, without which it is difficult to implement democratic government. The rejection of national borders and advocacy of one sovereign Muslim nation, *dar-al-Islam*, the ‘house of Islam’, are key elements of radical Islamic doctrine. Alleged violation of *dar-al-Islam* is a familiar refrain of Islamic radicals.

Responsibility

The principle of responsibility is also central to a reconciliation of Islam and democracy. Being a Muslim requires *submission* (the literal translation of ‘Islam’) and *obedience* to God, whose will is articulated in the Quran but interpreted by whomever is able to claim sufficient scholarly credibility. Accountability to God is supreme. It is easy to assume that the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent bombings in London and Madrid lacked *any* sense of personal responsibility. Yet those who committed the crimes appear to have been convinced that God demanded such acts to liberate Muslims and their lands from oppression; this was their *sole* responsibility. The theological justification of such actions is a powerful weapon in the terrorists’ arsenal, and alien to the thinking of Western culture.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that Islamic and Western ideologies are not wholly irreconcilable. There are certainly passages in the Quran that are incompatible with liberal democracy. However, the Quran, in common with the historical texts of the other major religions, is read and interpreted according to the world-view of the reader. Interpretation matters. A “more balanced and realistic” U.S. policy agenda in the Middle East needs to reflect both the contradictions in Islamic and democratic ideologies, and the areas in which they appear to share common ground. There are important implications for the U.S. agenda in the Middle East. First, the United States should ensure that her policies and actions lend credibility to Muslims who support moderate interpretations of

the major Islamic texts. Second, the importance of this *human* element suggests that on-the-ground reality might be a better guide than ideology for U.S. policymakers.

The on-the-ground reality is interesting. Polls suggest that Muslims do not believe democracy to be incompatible with Islam. In a June 2006 survey, an average of 68% of European Muslims believed that democracy could work well in most Muslim countries. When asked the same question, 70% of Indonesians, 74% of Jordanians, 65% of Egyptians and 50% of Pakistanis agreed. Indeed, most of the world's Muslims live in democracies. Of the countries inhabited by the world's five largest Muslim populations, two (Indonesia and India) are classified by Freedom House as 'Free' and two (Bangladesh and Turkey) as 'Partly Free'.⁹⁶ Three of these countries (Indonesia, Bangladesh and Turkey) are Muslim-majority countries. All three of them have been led by women.⁹⁷

However, conditions in the Middle East are very different from those that prevail in South or South East Asia. In recognition of this, the next chapter will examine political and, to a lesser extent, social conditions in that troubled region.

⁹⁶ Freedom House, 'Freedom in the World 2007', accessed at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07_charts.pdf on 23 February 2007. The other country amongst those with the five largest Muslim populations is Pakistan, which Freedom House classifies as 'Not Free'.

⁹⁷ Megawati Sukarnoputri was President of Indonesia 2001-04; Tansu Ciller was Prime Minister of Turkey 1993-96; Khaleda Zia (1991-96) and Hasina Wazed (1996-2001) were Prime Minister of Bangladesh.

CHAPTER 6 – MIDDLE EASTERN DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE

INTRODUCTION

Even if there is no insurmountable theological or ideological obstacle to Middle Eastern democracy, the on-the-ground reality is often disappointing. Democratic reforms in the Middle East tend to fall short of Western expectations. Western ideologues are frustrated by the inconvenient fact that some of the more autocratic regimes in the Middle East (especially the Gulf monarchies) are Western-leaning and relatively liberal. Most observers also recognize that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a major roadblock and that the Iraq war has had a profound effect on the socio-political fabric of the Middle East. Freedom House's 2007 *Freedom in the World* report reveals the disparity between the Middle East and the rest of the world. Its summary of regional patterns is in Table 1.⁹⁸

Region	Free	Partly Free	Not Free
Asia Pacific	16 (41%)	12 (31%)	11 (28%)
The Americas	25 (71%)	9 (26%)	1 (3%)
CEE/FSU	13 (46%)	8 (29%)	7 (25%)
Middle East	1 (6%)	6 (33%)	11 (61%)
Sub-Saharan Africa	11 (23%)	22 (46%)	15 (31%)
Western Europe	24 (96%)	1 (4%)	0 (0%)

Table 1 – Freedom House summary of regional patterns by numbers of countries – 2006.

PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Freedom House

Table 2, an extract from Freedom House's 2007 *Freedom in the World* report, shows the status of democratization in Middle Eastern countries.

⁹⁸ Freedom House, 'Freedom In The World 2007: Freedom Stagnation Amid Pushback...', accessed at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07_overview_final.pdf, 9.

Trend	Country	PR	CL	Freedom Rating
	Israel	1	2	Free
	Turkey	3	3	Partly Free
	Kuwait	4	4▲	Partly Free
	Jordan	5	4	Partly Free
	Lebanon	5	4	Partly Free
↓	Bahrain	5	5	Partly Free
	Yemen	5	5	Partly Free
↓	Egypt	6	5	Not Free
	Oman	6	5	Not Free
	Qatar	6	5	Not Free
	UAE	6	5▲	Not Free
↓	Iran	6	6	Not Free
	Iraq	6	6▼	Not Free
↓	Eritrea	7	6	Not Free
	Syria	7	6▲	Not Free
	Saudi Arabia	7	6	Not Free
	Somalia	7▼	7	Not Free
	Sudan	7	7	Not Free

Table 2 –Comparative Measures of Freedom for Middle Eastern Countries⁹⁹

The Political Rights (PR) scores in the table are based on Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and Participation, and Functioning of Government. The Civil Liberties (CL) scores are derived from grades on Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. The scoring system and definitions of Free, Partly Free and Not Free are shown in Appendix B, Tables B5 and B6. The results are summarized in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Summary of Freedom House Comparative Measures of Freedom for Middle Eastern and North African countries - 2006

⁹⁹ Extracted from Freedom House report *Freedom in the World 2007*, accessed at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=5> on 8 February 2007. This table is a subset of one in the original report that covered all of the world's countries.

The Status of Democracy Index

Another assessment is the *Status of Democracy Index* (SDI) published by Saliba Sarsar in 1999. SDI is a simple but useful methodology for assessing democratic progress in Middle Eastern countries. Sarsar later derived a new assessment and published his findings in the *Middle East Quarterly* under the gloomy banner “The 2005 Survey: Progress Elusive.”¹⁰⁰ Sarsar used nine criteria, which are shown in Appendix B, Table B7, awarding a score of between 0 and 2 against each. This yielded a total SDI out of 18 for each country. Table 3 is an abbreviated but faithful version of Sarsar’s (which is shown in Appendix B, Table B8). It shows each country’s total score, its 2006 ranking and the trend relative to its 1999 ranking.¹⁰¹

Country	Total SDI (Max 18)	Ranking	Trend 1999 to 2006
Jordan	10.5	1	●
Lebanon	10.5	1	●
Algeria	9	3	●
Egypt	9	3	▲
Tunisia	9	3	▼
Yemen	9	3	▲
Kuwait	8.5	7	▼
Morocco	8	8	▼
Iraq	7	9	▲
Syria	7	9	▼
Bahrain	6.5	11	▲
Qatar	6	12	▲
UAE	6	12	●
Sudan	5	14	▲
Libya	5	14	●
Oman	5	14	●
Saudi Arabia	4	17	▲

▲ = more democracy; ▼ = less democracy; ● = no change

Table 3: Summary of Saliba Sarsar’s *Status of Democracy Index* - 2005

Despite attempts at democratic reform in a number of Arab states (including Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Iraq), Sarsar concluded that

¹⁰⁰ Saliba Sarsar, ‘Quantifying Arab Democracy - Democracy in the Middle East’, *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer 2006, accessed at <http://www.meforum.org/pf.php?id=970> on 2 February 2007.

¹⁰¹ The three assessments discussed in this chapter examine different, though largely overlapping, sets of countries. Table 4 takes account of these differences in providing a composite assessment.

“events fell short of...expectations.” He asserted pessimistically that “the Middle East remains authoritarian, saturated with patriarchal values, religious dogma, ideological and political extremism, and narrow economic interests...” However, Sarsar reflected that:

Still, each Arab state is unique. In many of the smaller Persian Gulf states, lack of movement on the status of democracy index does not suggest discord. While the United Arab Emirates’ score remains unchanged, most Emirati citizens do not view democratization as urgent...most citizens of the United Arab Emirates welcome changes in government and society through “consultation rather than confrontation,” and would prefer to have gradual reform implemented through rulers’ decrees.

Degrees of Autocracy

A third assessment was offered by Daniel Brumberg, who set out two classes of Middle Eastern regime.¹⁰² He offered that *full autocracies* “have zero tolerance for free debate or competitive politics,” while *liberal autocracies* “temper authoritarianism with pluralism.” Brumberg suggested that the full autocracies included Syria, Tunisia, Libya and Saudi Arabia (plus Iraq, but that has been overtaken by events), while Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, Algeria, Qatar and Yemen all merited the description ‘liberalized autocracy’.¹⁰³ He placed these countries on a spectrum as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Daniel Brumberg's assessment of levels of political pluralism in the Middle East.

¹⁰² Daniel Brumberg, ‘Liberalization Versus Democracy – Understanding Arab Political Reform’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2003.

¹⁰³ Brumberg kept his categorizations simple to remain in keeping with the focus of his work. The summary table shown below uses a more fine-grained categorization of regime types.

A Composite Assessment

A simple function was applied to each of the three data sets above to make them comparable. The results are set out in Table 4, in which each country is ranked according to the average of its adjusted scores.¹⁰⁴ The table also categorizes each country as: a fully autocratic republic (FAR) or monarchy (FAM); a liberal autocratic republic (LAR); a liberalizing monarchy (LM); a democracy (D); or a supported democracy (SD).¹⁰⁵ The methodology is not entirely scientific, but it does produce a composite analysis that is credible and useful.

Country	Regime Type	Freedom House Adjusted Score	Sarsar's Adjusted Score	Brumberg's Adjusted Score	Average Score	Overall Ranking
Morocco	LM		10	6	8	1
Jordan	LM	11.5	7.5	8	9	2=
Kuwait	LM	10.5	9.5	7	9	2=
Lebanon	D	11.5	7.5		9.5	4
Algeria	LAR		9	11	10	5
Egypt	LAR	14	9	9	10.66	6
Bahrain	LM	13	11.5	10	11.5	7
Yemen	LAR	13	9	13	11.66	8
Tunisia	FAR		9	15	12	9
Qatar	LM	14	12	12	12.66	10
UAE	LM	14	12		13	11
Oman	LM	14	13		13.5	12
Libya	FAR		13	16	14.5	13
Iraq	SD	15.5	11	18	14.83	14=
Syria	FAR	16.5	11	17	14.83	14=
Saudi Arabia	FAM	16.5	14	14	14.83	14=
Iran	FAR	15.5			15.5	17=
Sudan	FAR	18	13		15.5	17=

Table 4: Overall democratization rankings.

¹⁰⁴ The scores were adjusted to put them in the range 1-18, 1 being the best score and 18 the worst. The Freedom House scores began in the range 2-14. These were divided by 14 and multiplied by 18. Sarsar's set scores were already in the range 1-18 but needed to be inverted such that 18 was the best score, not the worst. This was achieved by subtracting 18 and multiplying by -1. Brumberg's 'scores' (the positions on the scale shown in Figure 2) began in the range 1-13. These were adjusted by adding 6 to each score to put it in the range 6-18, which was broadly comparable to the other two sets.

¹⁰⁵ Israel and Turkey, which were considered by only Freedom House, have been omitted. Both strong democracies, they would have been ranked first and second overall. Lebanon has been included as a fragile democracy and Iraq as a 'supported democracy' – one that would fail without external assistance.

MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS

Fully Autocratic Regimes

Table 4 categorizes the regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Sudan as fully autocratic. Tunisia's relatively good ranking is indicative of slow but steady liberalization. Saudi Arabia's poor ranking reflects the nature of its regime and the ultra-conservative influence of Wahhabism, although there is some progress in certain areas. Iran is an interesting case; at the national level it could be called a 'theocratic autocracy', but at the local level it is relatively democratic.

Brumberg identified three reasons why the leaders of full autocracies are so resistant to political reform. First, loss of control over the economy would deprive the ruling classes of plunder. Second, a lack of representative institutions makes it hard for leaders to take the first steps towards democracy. Democracy is "a black hole that promises only chaos and violence."¹⁰⁶ Third, fully autocratic regimes often retain power by repressing other tribal or religious groups. They assume, therefore, that loosening the shackles would lead to violent, vengeful upheaval and possibly their own destruction. Thus they are "trapped by an either-me-or you logic that makes reform seem like suicide."¹⁰⁷

Liberalizing Autocracies

Several of the countries shown in Table 4 are liberalizing autocracies of one sort or another. Daniel Brumberg described liberal autocracies thus:

¹⁰⁶ Daniel Brumberg, 'Liberalization Versus Democracy – Understanding Arab Political Reform', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2003, 4.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 4.

...their leaders not only tolerate but promote a measure of political openness in civil society, in the press, and even in the electoral system... Elections give opposition leaders a chance to compete, to enter parliaments, and, what is more, occasionally to serve as ministers. But they are autocratic in that their rulers always retain the upper hand. They control the security establishment, dominate the media, and dole out economic goodies to their favorite clients. With their ultimate reliance on the supreme authority of the monarch or president, liberalized autocracies provide a kind of virtual democracy.¹⁰⁸

Paradoxically, the empowerment of opposition parties, labour unions, business groups and civic organizations can reinforce the positions of liberalizing autocratic leaders. Such groups can be played off against one another and allowed to blow off steam without letting them destabilize the regime. Brumberg suggested that the “steam valve must meet opponents’ minimal expectations for political openness and participation but prevent them from undermining the regime’s ultimate control.”¹⁰⁹

Liberalizing Monarchies

Of the liberalizing autocracies shown in Table 4, all but Algeria, Egypt and Yemen are monarchies. Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait, stable kingdoms in which the monarchs have granted limited civil and political liberties, have the best scores of all the countries considered.

Middle Eastern monarchs tend to be more enthusiastic about modernization than the leaders of republics. This may be because their authority is not derived from the political process, nor is it dependent on the support of any one party or block; it hereditary, religious or both. Thus, the king stands apart from the political process, able to give the players room to vie for influence and position without risking his own authority. A

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 3.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 5.

president has no such luxury; he is part of the political process and reliant on the support of at least some of the actors in it. Daniel Brumberg illustrated the point thus:

In the early-1990s King Hassan was pressed to revise the Family Code. As *Amir il Mu'minin* or Commander of the Faithful, he welcomed this chance to promote reforms in ways that reinforced his own authority. He did this by skilfully playing off the various women's and religious associations that constitute Morocco's civil society. While the revised law pleased no one, passage of the new Family Code reminded Moroccans that in the final analysis the king decides the limits of reform.

By contrast, Algeria's presidents have been wedded to a presidential system and ruling party that long ago tried to placate Islamic sentiments by upholding a traditional Family Code. As a result, not a single president has dared toy with the Family Code since Algeria tried in 1997 to reinvigorate its battered political system.

Political Islam

Most Middle Eastern countries face the challenge of forging a compromise between Islamists and secularists. The issue of *identity* is central. The competing influences of monarchy, tribe, clan, family, religion and Arab nationalism are fundamental in Middle Eastern politics. A lack of national identity, and thus unity, creates opportunity for the potentially unifying influence of *Political Islam*.

Political Islam is based on the notion that "Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world..."¹¹⁰ Although Political Islam is often mistaken for a single movement that spans the Islamic world, each of its manifestations is, in reality, shaped by local circumstances. According to Professor Mohammed Ayoob:

...the Islamist political imagination is largely determined by context...Jamaat-i-Islami is as Pakistan-specific as the Islamic Salvation Front is Algeria-specific. The strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt and has branches in various Arab countries, differ from country to country. The Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian variants have adopted radically different political strategies in response to local challenges.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Graham Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, New York, Palgrave, 2003, xi.

¹¹¹ Professor Mohammed Ayoob, 'Political Islam: Image or Reality', *World Policy Journal*, Fall 2004, 2.

Political Islam does well in elections when given the opportunity, partly because Islamist parties often fill the political space created by the repression of secular organizations. They are hard to suppress because of the sanctity of the Mosque and the fine line between a sermon and a political manifesto. However, the empowerment of professionally, tribally or ethnically-based opposition groups in liberal autocracies has often been sufficient to prevent Islamists from accumulating enough political power to threaten the regime. Attempting to shut out politically-activated Islamists can lead to chaos - as in Algeria in the 1990s. Thus, Islamists and secular groups have learned to compromise. F. Gregory Gause III recorded Islamist parties' recent progress:

In all recent Arab elections, [Islamists] have emerged as the government's leading political opposition... In Morocco, the [Islamist] Justice and Development Party...took 42 of the 325 seats in the parliamentary elections of 2002, its first contest. The same year, in Bahrain, Islamist candidates took between 19 and 21 of the 40 seats in parliament... In the 2003 parliamentary election in Yemen, the Yemeni Reform Group (Islah), a combination of Islamist and tribal elements, won 46 of the 301 seats and now forms the opposition. That year, Islamists combined to win 17 of the 50 seats in the Kuwaiti parliament, where they form the dominant ideological bloc. In the 2003 parliamentary election in Jordan...the Muslim Brotherhood's political party won 17 of 110 seats and independent Islamists took another 3 seats, forming the major opposition bloc. In the [2005] Saudi municipal elections, [Islamists] won 6 of the 7 seats in Riyadh and swept the elections in Jidda and Mecca.¹¹²

CONCLUSION

The political make-up of the Middle East remains disconcerting for Western advocates of democracy. No less than 61% of Middle Eastern countries are judged 'Not Free' by Freedom House. Nevertheless, Middle Eastern regimes occupy a broad spectrum. Analysis suggests that 'liberalizing monarchies' – a description merited by every Middle Eastern monarchy except that in Saudi Arabia – are doing relatively well, as are a few 'liberalizing republics'. As Saliba Sarsar put it: "lack of movement on the

¹¹² Gregory Gause III, 'Can Democracy Stop Terrorism', *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005.

status of democracy index does not suggest discord.” On the other hand, five of the six countries considered to be fully autocratic are among the world’s least liberal countries.

The leaders of the Middle East’s liberal autocracies have discovered that limited pluralism strengthens their positions and keeps the West reasonably happy. Provision of space for political and civil movements gives voice to opposing political movements, including Islamist parties, without risking the regime. Political Islam is an increasingly important feature of this political landscape. Further democratization in the Middle East would undoubtedly increase the influence of Islamist parties. This is a discomfoting proposition for many in the West, yet there is scant evidence of close ties between Islamist political parties and terrorist groups. Political Islam is a loose description for many political groups across the Muslim world. Although such groups have much in common, Political Islam is not a homogenous movement. The West must learn to cooperate with the elements that are prepared to work within the political processes of their countries, while seeking to isolate the minority that merely give political voice to Islamic terrorists and insurgents.

These circumstances represent a set of dilemmas for U.S. policymakers. While few Middle Eastern countries are democratic, many are stable and prosperous. The three Middle Eastern regimes that appear to be the most liberal are the monarchies in Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait. Rightly, these three undemocratic states enjoy relatively close relations with the West – as do all of the Middle East’s monarchies, although one of them, Saudi Arabia, remains one of the world’s most autocratic countries. Realist, ideological and ethical influences point the U.S. policy agenda in different directions. U.S. policymakers must find the right balance, a challenge addressed by the final chapter.

CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Earlier chapters of this paper described a strategic environment that is complex and volatile. Some analyses of this environment contend that perpetual conflict between Western and Islamic civilizations is inevitable, due partly to the irreconcilability of their core beliefs. Nowhere are these differences more pronounced than in the Middle East, a refuge for autocratic government and widespread social and economic deprivation. Other analyses offer hope of an “alliance of civilizations.” As this paper has shown, Western and Islamic ideologies and socio-political systems are not wholly incompatible. Yet, despite these encouraging signs, real progress has been elusive for the Bush Administration and its *freedom agenda*. U.S. policymakers and strategists now face significant challenges in their efforts to shape policy and strategies for the future. This concluding chapter reiterates these challenges and points to potential solutions.

A UTOPIAN APPROACH TO PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

The Bush Administration’s approach to democracy-promotion has been strident and utopian, causing Middle Eastern politicians to complain about being lectured on democracy at gunpoint. The evidence suggests that the United States should be more realistic and less imperious in her foreign relations. The key is to strike the right balance between realism and idealism. As Madeleine Albright put it, “policy must begin with the world as is but also work for what we would like it to be.”¹¹³ In other words, the United

¹¹³ Madeleine K Albright, ‘A Realistic Idealism: There's a Right Way to Support Democracy in the Mideast’, *The Washington Post*, 8 May 2006.

States must anchor her approach in today's strategic environment, while aspiring to a vision of a better future - a vision that must be shared by the Middle East's inhabitants, who are ever-resentful of outside impositions. It must not be described in the utopian political language of recent years, as Madeleine Albright agreed when she stated that "democracy is not a ticket to some heavenly kingdom where all evil is vanquished and everyone agrees with us."¹¹⁴ Instead, it should be described in terms that are meaningful, and which offer things of value, to Middle Eastern people.

Recommendation 1: The United States' desired endstates in the Middle East should reflect basic democratic ideals that offer things of discernable value to the people of the region. Such ideals are: freedom, human rights, equality, consent-based government, the rule of law, sovereignty and responsibility.

Recommendation 2: The United States should pursue her desired endstates through realistic strategies that take due account of the strategic environment.

Recommendation 3: The United States should discard the imperious rhetoric used in recent years to communicate the 'freedom agenda' in favour of a less strident approach.

DISENTANGLING DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY

The United States has entangled the democracy and security aspects of her policy, suggesting at times that security is a precursor for democracy, and at others that democracy is a precursor for lasting security and stability. The latter view has been

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

conspicuous in the War on Terror. The 2006 *National Security Strategy* suggests some of the causes of terrorism¹¹⁵ and asserts that “the genius of democracy is that it provides a counter to each.”¹¹⁶ President Bush has maintained consistently in his speeches that democracy is the antidote to terrorism.¹¹⁷

However, a considerable body of informed opinion rejects this notion. William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg found that in the 1970s and 1980s, the incidence of terrorism was highest in democracies, and that both the perpetrators and victims of terrorism were generally citizens of democracies.¹¹⁸ Robert Pape catalogued every suicide bombing around the world from 1980 to early 2004 and found that in over 95% of them, the key motivation was neither local deprivation nor envy of distant democracies, but rather to compel democracies to withdraw forces from their homelands.¹¹⁹ F. Gregory Gause III also noted the “difficulty of assuming that democracy can solve the terrorism problem.” Comparing India, the world’s most populous democracy, and China, the world’s most populous authoritarian state, he observed that “For 2000-2003, the *Patterns of Global Terrorism* report indicates 203 international terrorist attacks in India and none in China.”¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ The Strategy offers four key causes of terrorism: “political alienation,” “grievances that can be blamed on others,” “sub-cultures of conspiracy and misinformation,” and “an ideology that justifies murder.”

¹¹⁶ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, Ch III, 10.

¹¹⁷ For example, President Bush stated that “Effective democracies...are the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism today,” White House fact sheet *The President's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 5 Sep 05, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060905.html> on 10 May 2007.

¹¹⁸ Eubank and Weinberg, ‘Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Spring 2001.

¹¹⁹ Associate Professor Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Random House, May 2005.

¹²⁰ F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Can Democracy Stop Terrorism’, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005.

In fact, the introduction of democracy may be counter-productive. Jessica Stern, a noted U.S. expert on terrorism, argues that democracy is a poor method for fighting terrorism because of countries' acute vulnerability during the transition to democracy. There is also scant evidence to support the glib assertion that terrorists are afraid of democracy.¹²¹ It is more likely that Islamic radicals see democracy as 'un-Islamic' and resent the West's perceived intent to impose it in Muslim countries. Finally, U.S. rhetoric on democracy renders some relatively undemocratic partners in the War on Terror vulnerable to internal criticism, which could backfire on the United States and her allies. The most worrying example is nuclear-armed Pakistan, where President Mubarak's support for the United States makes him deeply unpopular with large segments of Pakistan's turbulent society.

In Iraq, the United States is beginning to adopt a more encouragingly realistic strategy, which should begin to quiet the chorus of voices that considered American goals in Iraq too utopian and thus unreachable. Despite allegedly dismissing the Iraq Study Group report as a "flaming turd," President Bush mirrored a number of its recommendations in his own revised strategy for Iraq, which incorporated a range of realistic political and economic measures at the local, national and regional levels.

Recommendation 4: The United States should recognize that democracy is a desired endstate, not a strategic concept. Security is one of the required preconditions for democracy and measures to achieve security should, therefore, be incorporated into the United States' Middle Eastern strategies.

¹²¹ For example, President Bush stated that "The terrorists are afraid of democracies" in a press conference with Prime Minister Maliki of Iraq, 25 July 2006, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060725.html> on 10 May 2007.

THE REALITIES OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS

It was shown in earlier chapters that Islam is not fundamentally incompatible with democracy. However, the progress of liberalization is disappointingly slow in the Middle East, where balance-of-power politics remain pre-eminent. The *freedom agenda* faces three significant challenges in the Middle East: first, the relative successes of “liberalizing” but fundamentally undemocratic Middle Eastern monarchies; second, the rise of Political Islam; and third, the fact that free elections do not necessarily yield the desired results.

You Might Not Like What You Get

The cases of Hamas and Hezbollah are sometimes used to demonstrate that democracy has a tendency to empower the wrong people. The refusal of Hamas to repudiate terrorism or recognize Israel after its January 2006 election victory in the Palestinian Territories is used as an example of what can happen when democracy is implemented prematurely. Hezbollah, emboldened by its strategic victory over Israel in 2006, has done everything possible to destabilize the Lebanese government of Fouad Siniora; yet it is legitimized, to some degree, by Lebanon’s democratic process.

However, these problems do not, as many claim, provide compelling evidence of the inapplicability of democracy to the Middle East. In the Palestinian Territories, Hamas and Fatah reached an accommodation on 8 February 2007, lending some credence to the view that Hamas will ultimately moderate its behaviour due to the responsibilities of government. The key issue in the Palestinian Territories remains the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, not democracy. In Lebanon, the elected government is holding on,

just, while Hezbollah remains marginally on the right side of the constitutional line.

Recommendation 5: The United States should accept the realities of Middle Eastern democratization, supporting and rewarding¹²² progress where possible and avoiding over-reaction to setbacks.

Recommendation 6: The United States should support Lebanon's democratic government using all feasible ways and available means, short of direct intervention.

Recommendation 7: In the Palestinian Territories, Hamas and Fatah should be encouraged to eschew violence and rewarded for progress towards responsible government and reconciliation with Israel.

Political Islam

Both opinion polls and real-world events show that Political Islam is an important force in Middle Eastern politics. Westerners are almost instinctively fearful of Islamist political parties, yet there is little evidence that those in mainstream politics represent a significant threat to regional stability.

The United States' dilemma in dealing with the Middle East's diverse political forces is again indicative of the tension in policy between realism and ideology. The required approach has two key tenets. First, the United States should make its policy and rhetoric more consistent by continuing to deal with Middle Eastern friends while encouraging liberalization in a context that is safe for their regimes. Second, the United

¹²² Rewards can include economic inducements, changes in diplomatic status, visits from high-ranking officials and changes in US policy on key issues.

States should seek to cooperate with Islamist political parties that reject violence and are prepared to work within the political processes of their countries. There is a chance that such organizations, if dealt with carefully, will promote moderation among Middle Eastern people – particularly the young men currently drawn towards radicalism because they have nowhere else to turn. This notion reflects an understanding that Islam is a significant factor in Middle Eastern society and in the War on Terror; yet accepts that Islam itself is not wholly antithetical to Western ideals. While many in the West treat democracy and Islam as an either/or choice, Political Islam could perhaps be a vehicle for their reconciliation.

Recommendation 8: The United States should accept that Political Islam may present an opportunity to reconcile Western and Islamic political traditions, and perhaps to moderate radical elements within Islam. She should reflect this acceptance in policy and in public diplomacy.

MORAL AUTHORITY

Moral authority is crucial for a hegemonic power. Alexis de Tocqueville is alleged to have said that “America is great because she is good, and if America ever ceases to be good, she will cease to be great.” The perception that the United States has lost moral authority is conspicuous in the Middle East. The Jordan Times reflected Middle Eastern attitudes when it asserted that “whenever the defence of democratic values has come into conflict with the defence of US interests, the latter always win out.” A 2004 Anwar Sadat/Zogby poll found that attitudes towards the United States were based more on her *policies* than on her *values*. The two were seen as inconsistent. A majority of the

survey's respondents believed that "protecting Israel" (74%), "controlling oil" (73%), and "desire to dominate the region" (62.8%) had been the United States' principal aims in Iraq, while just 6% identified democracy or spreading human rights as key U.S. goals.¹²³

Former Ambassador Chas W. Freeman Jr. agreed, warning that:

Muslim extremists cannot destroy us and what we have stood for, but we can surely forfeit our moral convictions and so discredit our values that we destroy ourselves. We have lost international support not because foreigners hate our values but because they believe we are repudiating them and behaving contrary to them. To prevail, we must remember who we are and what we stand for.¹²⁴

Human Rights

Human rights are key to regaining moral authority. The United States has attracted persistent criticism for her human rights record since 2001. The *Alliance of Civilizations* report stated pointedly that the selective observance of human rights by certain countries "undercuts the legitimacy of the multilateral institutions mandated to articulate, advance, and advocate for those principles."¹²⁵ The State Department's 2005 report on human rights was criticized for its alleged hypocrisy. In response to the report's criticisms, the Chinese cabinet retorted that the United States "frequently commits wanton slaughters," and the Russian Foreign Ministry declared that "double standards are a characteristic of the American approach." Turkish newspaper *Hurriyet* observed that in the State Department's report "there is not even a mention of the incidents in Abu Ghraib prison," and "no mention of Guantanamo, either."

¹²³ Survey conducted by the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, the University of Maryland, and Zogby International: 'Arab Attitudes Towards Issues, Foreign Policy and the Media,' May 2004.

¹²⁴ Chas W. Freeman Jr., former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Remarks to the USIA Alumni Association, 4 October 2006, Washington DC, published by the Middle East Policy Council, 1 Feb 07.

¹²⁵ Alliance of Civilizations Report of the High-Level Group, released on 13 November 2006 and accessed at http://www.unaoc.org/repository/HLG_Report.pdf on 30 January 2007, Paragraph 3.4.

Reflecting such concerns, a U.S.-based coalition of human rights and civil liberties groups proposed a “10 Step Plan to Restore Moral Authority” in a letter to Congress on 22 February 2007 (shown in Appendix C, Figure C3). It asserted that “the moral authority of the United States has been undermined by the federal government’s unprecedented and illegal [use of] abusive interrogations, indefinite detention without charge – often in secret locations – and rendition to torture.”¹²⁶ Jennifer Daskal, U.S. Advocacy Director at Human Rights Watch, urged Congress to “restore Washington’s moral authority at home and abroad.”¹²⁷

Recommendation 9: The United States should take steps to recover and retain moral authority, attending to her own human rights record and, more generally, remaining alert to the danger of inconsistency between her own rhetoric and deeds. She must deal expeditiously with Guantánamo Bay.

An Ethical Element in Policy

Earlier chapters identified the two major pillars of the Bush Doctrine as democracy and security. These pillars represent the two influences that traditionally bound U.S. foreign policy: ideology and realism. The restoration of moral authority requires a deliberate and overt effort to balance these existing influences with a third: *ethics*. Thus, the questions “is it in our interests” and “is it consistent with our ideology” would be balanced by two more: “is it an ethical thing to do?” and “how can it be done ethically?”

¹²⁶ Human Rights Watch *Letter on the Ten Steps to Restore the United States' Moral Authority - A Common Sense Agenda for the 110th Congress*, 22 Feb 07, accessed at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/02/22/usdom15383.htm> on 25 Feb 07. The proposed 10 Steps included the restoration of Habeas Corpus rights to detainees, closure of the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, prohibiting “abusive interrogations” and the abolition of “secret prisons”. The letter and 10 Steps are shown in Appendix C, Figures C3 and C4.

¹²⁷ Quote reproduced at Human Rights Watch News – US: 10 Steps to Restore US Moral Authority, accessed at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/02/22/usdom15386.htm> on 25 February 2007.




Figure 3: Influences in foreign affairs.

It should be relatively easy to reconcile the ideological and ethical influences, but the latter can be very difficult indeed to reconcile with national interests. Nevertheless, for U.S. strategies to be credible and effective, they need to balance these influences in a way that positions them as near as possible to the centre of the diagram in Figure 3. An approach that is demonstrably more ethical could begin to change minds in the Middle East, perhaps beginning to deprive Islamic radicals of popular support.

Recommendation 11: The United States should deliberately incorporate an ethical pillar into her foreign policy.

Autocratic Allies

The 2006 *National Security Strategy* links democratic progress to the opportunity to “cement close relations with the United States,”¹²⁸ In practice U.S. foreign relations tend to be based on more pragmatic criteria, which does not go unnoticed in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are all considered ‘Not Free’ by Freedom House, yet all enjoy close relations with the United States. While the House of Saud continues to preside over one of the world’s most autocratic regimes, the

¹²⁸ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, Ch VIII, 36.

State Department's background notes state that "Saudi Arabia's unique role in the Arab and Islamic worlds, its possession of the world's largest reserves of oil, and its strategic location make its friendship important to the United States."¹²⁹

Recommendation 10: The United States should continue to deal with Middle Eastern regimes that promote regional stability and show signs of liberalization, and avoid undermining such regimes with unnecessarily strident rhetoric on democracy. The need to act consistently demands that the relationship with Saudi Arabia, which shows scant sign of liberalization, must be handled carefully. Saudi Arabia is too important to alienate, yet the ideological and ethical influences in policy demand recognition of her illiberality.

EVEN-HANDEDNESS

The resolution of the Palestinian question is a pre-cursor to real progress elsewhere in the Middle East. The *Alliance of Civilizations* report acknowledged the importance of the issue and called for a "re-invigorated multilateral peace process." It identified the significance of opposing Arab and Israeli perspectives on the creation of the state of Israel, asserting that these reflected "divergent interpretations of recent history: different ways of describing conflicts, occupation, and peace negotiation efforts."¹³⁰

More than 50 former British diplomats agreed with this view in an open letter to Tony Blair in April 2004, stating that the "Israel/Palestine conflict...has for decades

¹²⁹ The State Department also reports that "The United States and Egypt enjoy a strong and friendly relationship..." while the U.S. has enjoyed friendly relations with the U.A.E. since 1971" and bi-lateral relations with Qatar are "strong and expanding" Relations with Oman are also close.

¹³⁰ Alliance of Civilizations Report of the High-Level Group, released on 13 November 2006, 18.

poisoned relations between the west and the Islamic and Arab worlds.” Blair said in August 2006 that the requirement to “re-energize the MEPP between Israel and Palestine” was “utterly fundamental,” but that the West would have to “change radically [its] degree of focus, effort and engagement, especially with the Palestinian side.”¹³¹

There is no doubt that unwavering and apparently unconditional U.S. support for Israel is an issue of great importance to Arabs. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acknowledged in October 2006 that “the inability to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to color the views of the region about American policy.”¹³² A more even-handed approach would be of universal benefit and need not give ground on Israel’s right to exist or compromise its security. As John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt stated correctly in the conclusion to their controversial monologue *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* of March 2006, “using American power to achieve a just peace between Israel and the Palestinians would help advance the broader goals of fighting extremism and promoting democracy in the Middle East.”

Recommendation 12: The United States should re-balance her approach to Arab-Israeli issues so that it is visibly even-handed, while continue to assert Israel’s right to exist and guaranteeing its security.

Recommendation 13: The United States should engender renewed diplomatic efforts to achieve a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

¹³¹ British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 1 August 2006.

¹³² Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice speaking to the print media in Cairo on 3 October 2006, accessed at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/73555.htm> on 23 November 2006.

KEEP YOUR FRIENDS CLOSE AND YOUR ENEMIES CLOSER

Avoiding Isolation

The United States adopted a “with us or against us” approach after 9/11. The approach has undoubtedly had its successes. Bob Woodward recorded Richard Armitage telling General Mahmoud Ahmad, head of the Pakistani intelligence service, that “Pakistan faces a stark choice, either it is with us or it is not” in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks.¹³³ Secretary of State Colin Powell later reported that President Musharraf had accepted all seven of his demands.¹³⁴ However, few countries are prepared to accept a bipolar model of the post-Cold War world. Even within America’s ‘own’ civilization, France and Germany were not prepared to support the Iraq war (considering that it was not justified by the War on Terror). The United States requires an approach that re-focuses diplomatic efforts on consensus-building and thus ‘keeps friends close’.

Recommendation 14: The United States should seek and maintain broad international consensus on her approach in the Middle East.

Reviving Diplomacy

The Bush Administration’s refusal to talk to a set of rogue states making up an “Axis of Evil” has reflected a belief that diplomatic engagement is synonymous with endorsement. However, refusing to negotiate with Iran, and to a lesser extent with Syria, reduces the range of levers available to the United States and her partners in the Middle East. While many influential voices support this view, the Administration appears to

¹³³ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2002, 47.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 61.

remain in two minds. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated on 16 November 2006 that she “will talk to anybody, anywhere, anytime under the right circumstances,”¹³⁵ yet the new strategy for Iraq included intensification of efforts to “counter Iranian and Syrian influence inside Iraq.”¹³⁶

Communication between Iran and the United States would not be unprecedented. In early 2003, Iran proposed a dialogue “in mutual respect,” offering “active Iranian support” in Iraq and to withhold “material support to Palestinian opposition groups.”¹³⁷ However, Iran’s conditions, including “access to peaceful nuclear technology” and an implication that Israel must return to pre-1967 borders, were deemed unacceptable. In May and November 2006, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadi Nejad wrote open letters to President Bush¹³⁸ and to the “noble” American people.¹³⁹ The sincerity and significance of these overtures is debatable, but the diplomatic door may be ajar.”¹⁴⁰

Dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional mischief-making will be challenging. Many in the United States would consider diplomatic engagement with Iran to be a sign of weakness by their government. Many in Iran might agree. In the long-term, the issue of nuclear weapons is fundamental. It is possible that Iran’s behaviour

¹³⁵ U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on-the-record briefing *en route* to Hanoi, Vietnam, 15 November 2006, accessed at <http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/76085.htm> on 14 February 2007.

¹³⁶ White House Fact Sheet *The New Way Forward in Iraq*, 10 January 2007, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-3.html> on 27 February 2007.

¹³⁷ The 2003 Iranian proposal is at http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/2003_Spring_Iran_Proposal.pdf. It is discussed by the National Iranian American Council at http://www.niacouncil.org/pressreleases/press415.asp#_ftn10 and the American Prospect Online Edition at http://www.prospect.org/web/page._ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=11539. Its authenticity is in no serious doubt.

¹³⁸ President Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad of Iran, Letter to the President of the United States, 9 May 2006, accessed at <http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/world/0605/transcript.lemonde.letter/> on 2 December 2006.

¹³⁹ President Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad of Iran, Letter to the American People, 29 November 2006, accessed at http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/iran_pres_letter.pdf on 2 December 2006.

¹⁴⁰ British Prime Minister Tony Blair, annual address on world affairs to the Lord Mayor's Banquet, the Guildhall, London, 13 November 2006, accessed at Downing Street's official website <http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10409.asp> on 25 November 2006.

would be moderated by her ascendancy to the “nuclear club”, which has been the norm for new nuclear powers in the past. However, another possibility is that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons would herald a dangerous era of swaggering power-politics and bravado in the Middle East, not least because the region’s major Sunni Muslim power, Saudi Arabia, would be anxious to match Shi’ite Iran’s nuclear capability with one of her own. Either way, the West’s approach to dealing with Iran has not worked in recent years. Something, therefore, must change.

Recommendation 15: The United States should engage Iran and Syria diplomatically. She must be prepared to offer reward for their assistance and reciprocation for their concessions, while retaining the capacity (military and otherwise) to punish their transgressions.

BALANCING MEANS

The United States should rebalance her Middle Eastern strategies to exploit the instruments of national power more effectively. Perhaps understandably, the military instrument has been emphasized above the diplomatic, informational and economic instruments since 9/11. Less understandable has been the apparent simplification of American statecraft. A former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia said in October 2006 that “Both Republicans and Democrats seem to consider that statecraft boils down to two options: appeasement; or sanctions followed by military assault. Both behave as though national security and grand strategy require no more than a military component.”¹⁴¹ The

¹⁴¹ Chas W. Freeman Jr., former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Remarks to the USIA Alumni Association, 4 October 2006, Washington, DC, published online by the Middle East Policy Council and accessed at <http://www.mepc.org/whats/whynot.asp> on 1 February 2007.

9/11 Commission Report also recognized the need for a balanced approach:

...long term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defence. If we favour one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.¹⁴²

Middle Eastern attention tends to focus particularly on the economic and political spheres, where the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative have made progress. Some of MEPI's achievements are in Appendix B, Table B9. The *Alliance of Civilizations* Report also urged participants in Middle Eastern affairs to adopt economic and social, as well as political agendas.¹⁴³ Its recommendations are in Appendix B, Table B10.

Recommendation 16: The United States should employ the instruments of her substantial national power more evenly in the Middle East. In the economic and political spheres, this should include reinforcing the work of MEPI and BMENA.

CONCLUSION

The thesis of this study was that **the United States requires a more balanced and realistic policy agenda in the Middle East, which discards the strident promotion of constitutional democracy in favour of a less imperious approach based on values that are meaningful to Middle Eastern people and societies.**

The study determined that the Bush Doctrine consists of three elements – security, a “with us or against us” approach to the post-9/11 world, and the promotion of democracy

¹⁴² *Executive Summary of the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, 20 September 2004.

¹⁴³ Alliance of Civilizations Report of the High-Level Group, 13 November 2006, 7-21.

– which combine in an approach that is seen increasingly as imperious and unrealistic. In particular, the Administration has adopted a utopian, all-or-nothing approach to the promotion of constitutional democracy. This policy has not succeeded, partly because it does not reflect the nature of the strategic environment. As Madeleine Albright put it, “policy must begin with the world as is but also work for what we would like it to be.”

The paper suggested that the pursuit of constitutional democracy should be replaced by a policy centred on fundamental concepts that are widely applicable and meaningful to people in the Middle East. Such concepts are: freedom, human rights, equality, consent-based government, the rule of law, sovereignty and responsibility. Through a detailed comparison of Islamic and Western ideologies, it was shown that these core Western values are not irreconcilable with Islamic ideology. Islamic teachings spawn a broad spectrum of belief and interpretation is all-important. U.S. policy must seek to empower those Muslims who espouse moderate interpretations, while undermining those who promote intolerance and antipathy towards other religions and cultures.

An examination of on-the-ground political reality revealed that constitutional democracy has but a tenuous foothold in the Middle East. However, broader-based liberalization - based largely on the core values set out above - is doing better. Many Middle Eastern regimes are making progress and improving the lives of their citizens while remaining fundamentally undemocratic. In this landscape, Political Islam is a particularly important phenomenon. The study revealed that Political Islam is a heterogeneous movement. The United States and her allies should support the groups

that are prepared to work alongside secular political parties and movements within a constitutional framework.

The study determined that a comprehensive agenda is needed. It acknowledged that the Palestinian Question must be answered, as must the questions about Iran's role in the Middle East and its relationship with the United States. In all, sixteen recommendations were derived.¹⁴⁴ These recommendations do indeed represent “a more balanced and realistic policy agenda” based on core ideals that are “meaningful to Middle Eastern people and societies.”

¹⁴⁴ A worksheet showing a hierarchy of assumed desired national endstates and recommended strategic ends, ways and means was developed to support formulation of the paper's final chapter. It is at Appendix E.

APPENDIX E - DESIRED NATIONAL ENDSTATES, ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS

Means – balanced application of all the instruments of national power	Strategic Concepts (Ways)	Strategic Ends	Policy – Desired National Endstates
	Create and describe policy and national strategy consistently on the basis of core values	Gain and safeguard acceptance in the Middle East of core liberal democratic values	Democracy is perpetuated
	Promote core values at all levels on the basis of their validity and universality (not their 'Americanness'), using all available media.	Restore U.S. moral authority	
	Be seen to improve the U.S. record on human rights, dealing with alleged abuses as necessary	Enhance the ability of the U.S. to leverage her goals in the Middle East	The U.S. is safe from attack
	Rebuild international (especially Western) consensus on Middle Eastern issues and the U.S. role in the region	Advance liberalization in the Middle East	Middle Eastern stability and prosperity are enhanced
	Engage in broad-based regional diplomacy to leverage U.S. goals, engaging both friends and enemies	Enhance responsible government in the Middle East	
	Enhance non-military initiatives in the Middle East, including MEPI, BMENA and the work of USAID	Prevent explicitly threatened or actual misuse of WMD	U.S. interests in the Middle East (including First World access to oil) are safeguarded
	Fight terrorists as prescribed by GWOT directives	Degrade and, where possible, defeat terrorists	
	Prevent Iran gaining WMD through persuasion, inducement and deterrence	Stabilize Iraq and withdraw U.S. forces	U.S. forces are rebalanced for future contingencies
	Prepare to assure Iran's responsible ownership of nuclear weapons using all the instruments of power	Ease the regional tension created by the Israeli-Palestinian dispute	Israel is safe
	Implement new Bush strategy in Iraq	Promote reconciliation and cooperation between the United States and the Islamic world	The United States co-exists peacefully with the mainstream Islamic world
	Persuade regional powers to influence events in Iraq constructively	Undermine the theological credibility of Islamic radicals	
	Act even-handedly with regard to Israel and her neighbours		

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APPENDIX B – TABLES

Table B1: Members of the Alliance of Civilizations High Level Group.

Co-Sponsors	
Prof. Mehmet Aydin (Turkey)	Minister of State of Turkey and Professor of Philosophy
Prof. Federico Mayor (Spain)	President, Culture of Peace Foundation and Former Director-General, UNESCO
Middle East	
Seyed Mohamed Khatami (Iran)	Former President of Iran
Her Highness Sheikha Mozah (Qatar)	Consort of the Emir, State of Qatar. Chairperson, Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development
Dr. Ismail Serageldin (Egypt)	President, Bibliotheca Alexandria
North Africa	
Dr. Mohamed Charfi (Tunisia)	Former Education Minister of Tunisia
Mr. André Azoulay (Morocco)	Adviser to His Majesty King Mohammed VI of Morocco
West Africa	
Mr. Moustapha Niasse (Senegal)	Former Prime Minister of Senegal
Southern Africa	
Archbishop Desmond Tutu (S. Africa)	The Rt. Hon. Archbishop of Cape Town
West Europe	
Mr. Hubert Vedrine (France)	Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, France
Ms. Karen Armstrong (UK)	Historian of Religion
East Europe	
Prof. Vitaly Naumkin (Russia)	President of the International Center for Strategic and Political Studies and Chair, Moscow State University
North America	
Prof. John Esposito (US)	Founding Director, Prince Al-Waleed bin-Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding (Georgetown University) and Editor-in-Chief of the Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Islamic World
Rabbi Arthur Schneier (US)	President, Appeal of Conscience Foundation and Senior Rabbi, East Park Synagogue
Latin America	
Mr. Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay)	Ibero-American Secretary-General and Former President of Inter American Development
Prof. Candido Mendes (Brazil)	Secretary-General, Académie de la Latinité
South Asia	
Dr. Nafis Sadik (Pakistan)	Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General
Ms. Shobhana Bhartia (India)	Member of Parliament, India; Vice Chairperson and Editorial Director, <i>The Hindustan Times</i> , New Delhi
South East Asia	
Mr. Ali Alatas (Indonesia)	Former Foreign Minister of Indonesia
East Asia	
Prof. Pan Guang (China)	Director and Professor, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences

Table B2: MEPI Goals.¹⁴⁵**Political Pillar**

- Strengthen democratic practices, electoral systems, including political parties and parliamentarians.
- Support an expanded public space where democratic voices can be heard in the political process.
- Strengthen the role of free and independent media in society.
- Promote the rule of law and accountable, effective government and judicial institutions.

Economic Pillar

- Encourage mobilization of foreign direct and domestic investment and facilitate revenue and employment growth of micro-enterprises and SMEs.
- Advance private sector job creation.
- Enhance MEPI partner countries' global competitiveness.

Education Pillar

- Expand access to basic and post secondary education for all people, especially girls and women.
- Improve the quality of basic and post secondary education including teacher training, curriculum content, community empowerment, and digital readiness.
- Promote the development of employable skills.

Women's Empowerment Pillar

- Support the elimination of arbitrary legal systems and provide women with the skills and tools required to help build strong judicial institutions.
- Increase the level of women's participation in building democratic pluralistic societies, through both political representation and civil society strengthening.
- Assist local reformers in their struggle for women's rights, facilitating their organization and expanding their impact.
- Provide access and opportunity to women in an effort to enhance their marketable skills, gain economic independence, and increase the power of the private sector in building a democratic society.

¹⁴⁵ The 'MEPI Goals' page of the US Department of State MEPI website, accessed at <http://mepi.state.gov/c10120.htm> on 5 February 2007.

Table B3: The Ebenstein and Fogelman criteria for a democracy.

Rational empiricism , whereby a democratic society permits its people to seek information, to judge the truth and to express diverse points of view.
Emphasis on the individual , in contrast to the subservience of people to the state in an authoritarian regime. Individual rights are fundamental to democracy: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
The instrumental nature of the state , such that the state is not the highest authority, but instead merely an instrument for the achievement of higher goals.
A law behind the law , meaning that the law is higher than the state and governs relations between the state, society and individuals. This concept appears in both the American Declaration of Independence (“...a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence,...” ¹⁴⁶) and in the US Constitution, which protects individuals’ rights against excesses of the state.
Voluntarism , which is used to mean freedom of, or <i>voluntary</i> , association.
Emphasis on the means employed , such that the means employed in pursuit of a goal must be reasonable, no matter how important the desired outcome.
Discussion and consent in human relations.
Equality of all human beings.

Table B4: Areas addressed by Human Rights Watch.

Academic Freedom	Lesbian and Gay Rights
AIDS and Human Rights	Press Freedom
Arms	Prison Conditions and the Treatment of Prisoners
Caste Discrimination	Racism and Human Rights
Child Soldiers	Refugees
Children’s Rights	Religious Freedom
Corporations and Human Rights	Terrorism
Counterterrorism	Torture and Abuse
Diplomatic Assurances	Opportunism Watch: Repression in the Name of Anti-Terrorism
Drugs and Human Rights	United Nations
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	Women’s Rights
Free Expression on the Internet	
Human Rights Defenders	
International Criminal Court	
International Justice	
Labor & Human Rights	

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

Table B5 – Key to Freedom House *Comparative Measures of Freedom* PR and CL Ratings¹⁴⁷

Combined Average of the PR and CL Ratings	Country Status
1.0 – 2.5	Free
3.0 – 5.0	Partly Free
5.5 – 7.0	Not Free

Table B6 – Freedom House Definitions of Free, Partly Free and Not Free.¹⁴⁸

FREE, PARTLY FREE, NOT FREE
<p><i>Freedom in the World</i> provides three broad category designation for each of the countries and territories included in the index: Free, Partly Free, and Not Free.</p> <p>A Free country is one where there is broad scope for open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media.</p> <p>A Partly Free country is one in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. Partly Free states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and often a setting in which a single political party enjoys dominance despite the façade of limited pluralism.</p> <p>A Not Free country is one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied.</p>

Table B7: Status of Democracy Index Criteria.

Criteria	Remarks
Head of state freely elected	
Legislature/national council freely elected	
Political parties	
Suffrage	
Media freedom	The annual Freedom House survey.
Religious freedom	U.S. Department of State reports.
Human rights	Information from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the U.S. Department of State.
Human development	United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index.
Economic freedom	The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom.

¹⁴⁷ Extracted from Freedom House paper *Freedom in the World 2007 Methodology*, accessed at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2007> on 8 February 2007.

¹⁴⁸ Arch Puddington, Freedom House essay 'Freedom In The World 2007: Freedom Stagnation Amid Pushback Against Democracy' accessed at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07_overview_final.pdf on 8 February 2007, 2.

Country	Free Elections of Head of State	Free Election to Legislature or National Council	Political Parties	Suffrage	Media Freedom	Religious Freedom	Human Rights	Human Development	Economic Freedom	Total SDI (max = 18)	SDI %	Ranking	1999 SDI Score	Trend 1999 to 2006
(a)	(b)	I	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)
Jordan	0	1.5	1.5	2	0	1.5	1	1	2	10.5	58	1	10.5	●
Lebanon	1	1.5	1	1.5	1	1.5	1	1	1	10.5	58	1	10.5	●
Algeria	1.5	1.5	1	2	0	.5	.5	1	1	9	50	3	9	●
Egypt	1	1.5	1	2	0	1	.5	1	1	9	50	3	8	▲
Tunisia	1	1.5	.5	2	0	1.5	.5	1	1	9	50	3	10	▼
Yemen	1.5	1.5	1.5	2	0	1	.5	0	1	9	50	3	8.5	▲
Kuwait	0	1	0	1	1	1	.5	2	2	8.5	47	7	9	▼
Morocco	0	1.5	1.5	1.5	0	1	.5	1	1	8	44	8	11	▼
Iraq	1	1	1	1	.5	.5	0	1 est	1 est	7	39	9	2.5	▲
Syria	.5	1	.5	1.5	0	1	.5	1	1	7	39	9	8.5	▼
Bahrain	0	.5	0	.5	0	1	.5	2	2	6.5	36	11	5	▲
Qatar	0	.5	0	1	0	1	.5	2	1	6	33	12	5	▲
UAE	0	.5	0	0	0	1	.5	2	2	6	33	12	6	●
Sudan	0	1	.5	1.5	0	0	0	1	1 est	5	28	14	4.5	▲
Libya	0	1	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	5	28	14	5	●
Oman	0	1	0	1	0	.5	.5	1	1	5	28	14	5	●
Saudi Arabia	0	.5	0	.5	0	0	0	1	2	4	22	17	2.5	▲

Legend

A: 0 = no; 1 = indirect or partially free; 2 = yes

B: 0 = no; 1= indirect or limited; 2 = yes

C: 0 = prohibited or nonexistent; 1 = controlled by government approval; 2 = reasonably free

D: 0 = none; 1 = some; 2 = yes

E: 0 = not free; 1 = party free; 2 = free

F: 0 = none; 1 = some; 2 = yes

G: 0 = not observed; 1 = partly observed; 2 = fully observed

H: 0 = low human development; 1 = medium development; 2 = high human development

I : 0 = strong governmental interference; 1 = medium governmental interference; 2 = low governmental interference

▲ = more democracy; ▼ = less democracy; ● = no change in democracy

Table B9: Extract from The State Department's List of MEPI's Achievements.

<p>Political</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ...Support to over 2,000 domestic...monitors for Egypt's first multi-candidate election. • Supporting the only live satellite broadcasts of Arab parliamentary sessions. • Supporting national and local political party organizations and their members in countries that will have new rounds of municipal and parliamentary elections in 2005-2007. • Strengthening the role of civil society in the democratic process by facilitating dialogue among activists, NGOs, and foreign ministers at G8/BMENA meetings and by awarding more than 70 indigenous civil society organizations with direct grants. <p>Economic</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Entrepreneurial training for more than 180 participants from 16 Middle East and North African countries. Almost half were women. • Extended credit and services to small- and medium-sized businesses... • Established self-sustaining Junior Achievement chapters in 12 countries throughout the Middle East – over 10,000 students have participated... • Created the first-ever Business Women's Summit for Middle Eastern businesswomen. <p>Education</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Providing English language study to over 1,500 underserved youth from 13 countries... • Translated over 80 children's book titles into Arabic and providing more than a million new books to the Middle East... • Demonstrating...solutions to education challenges through 'Partnership Schools'... <p>Women</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raising the political, advocacy, and communication skills of women candidates... • Providing regional micro-enterprise and business internships for women... • Building a professional network for Arab women legal professionals... • Empowering grassroots women's NGOs across the region through targeted training on advocacy, negotiation, outreach and communication skills... • Providing training for judges and legal professionals on issues ranging from the family code to domestic violence and honor killings.

Table B10: Specific Recommendations Within the *Alliance of Civilizations Report's* Fields of Action.

<p>1. Education</p> <p>Governments, multilateral institutions, universities, education scholars and policy-makers should work separately and together to expand global, cross-cultural, and human rights education. Media literacy programs should be implemented in schools, particularly at the secondary level, to help develop a discerning and critical approach to news coverage by media consumers.</p> <p>Religious leaders, education policymakers, and interfaith civic organizations should work together to develop consensus guidelines for teaching about religions.</p> <p>Governments and international organizations should work together to convene curriculum review panels consisting of curriculum experts and representatives of the major faith traditions to review widely used educational curricula, ensuring they meet guidelines for fairness, accuracy, and balance in discussing religious beliefs and that they do not denigrate any faith or its adherents.</p> <p>Member states and multilateral organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the European Union should work together to implement educational efforts to build capacity for intercultural tolerance and respect, civic participation and social engagement.</p> <p>Governments together with international organizations, governments and technology firms, should collaborate to expand Internet access, with particular attention to predominantly Muslim countries.</p> <p>Governments should restore holistic and integrated education approaches as part of educational reform.</p>
<p>2. Youth</p> <p>A Global Youth Alliance should be established as a mechanism through which youth can contribute to the implementation of all of the recommendations set forth in this report (not just those under the “youth” theme).</p> <p>The United States, the European Union, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference should set a joint goal of taking the number of youth exchanges that occur between their countries from the bottom of the list of inter-regional exchanges to the top. Priority should be given to extended stay exchanges, group exchanges, and exchanges subsidized enough to allow participation from strata of society other than elite populations.</p> <p>Religious leaders and civil society activists should establish a network of websites that link youth to religious scholars who can speak in constructive ways to the contemporary challenges facing youth today.</p> <p>Muslim and Western public and private donors should work together to establish a Cultural Fund and Networking Service to connect young Muslim artists, writers, musicians, film makers, etc. with their Western counterparts and leaders in the culture industry.</p> <p>A coalition of key stakeholders should be established to develop a consensus youth employment strategy. A coalition of multilateral agencies and civil society organizations with experience in fostering youth employment should be convened and supported to pilot broad-based youth employment initiatives, particularly in countries where youth unemployment and alienation are major problems.</p> <p>Public and private donor agencies should support girls’ and young women’s associations, networks, and organizations which advance girls’ education, develop platforms for women’s participation in all aspects of society, or implement other projects which enhance women’s status.</p>

Table B10 (Continued).**3. Migration**

Governments with significant immigrant populations should expand incentives, support mechanisms, and funding for schools and associations that work with schools to involve students in service-learning and civic education programs.

Municipal governments and local foundations should expand support for the establishment of youth community organizations.

Public and private donors should increase funding of civil society institutions that work with immigrant communities to develop support mechanisms that allow for greater parental involvement in schools and that provide information and education to empower immigrant communities.

The European Union should work with member states to standardize and integrate data collection across the continent which monitor immigrants' access to, and experience of, the labor and housing markets as well as health, social, educational and other community services.

Public and private donors that are concerned with interfaith relations and/or immigrant integration should expand funding for dialogue and community organizing within immigrant communities.

Immigrant community leaders and host country authorities should work together to produce material (including, for example, Internet newsletters, public service announcements and circulars) aimed at promoting respect for diversity and good community relations.

American and European universities and research centers should expand research into the significant economic, cultural, and social contributions of immigrant communities to American and European life. Likewise, they should promote publications coming from the Muslim world on a range of subjects related to Islam and the Muslim world.

Governments should participate in the Global Forum on Migration and International Development in order to increase cooperation and develop an integrated approach to migration and development.

4. Media

Media professionals must develop, articulate, and implement voluntary codes of conduct.

Training programs should be developed, with those Schools of Journalism interested to help widen journalists' understanding of critical international issues – particularly in those fields where politics and religion intersect – and enhance their capacity to inform the public accurately and in a balanced way.

Leaders in the fields of academia, religion, politics, civil society, and culture should generate media content (op-ed pieces, commentaries, and video- and audio-taped statements) that help to deepen inter-cultural understanding, especially in times of crisis.

Public and private donors should direct greater resources toward the production of media aimed at improving popular attitudes between different cultures.

Civil society and mass media leaders with a shared interest in the impact of television and film on cross-cultural relations should be encouraged and supported to produce films and other media content with the aim of improving understanding between different cultures.

Governments, media organizations and civil society should work together to develop programs that promote the Internet as an instrument of cross-cultural dialogue.

A collaborative and reciprocal initiative for monitoring media coverage of Islamic-Western relations should be started to provide a comprehensive review of media outlets and to reward efforts that aim to improve coverage of relations between Muslim and Western societies.

Public and private donors should establish a "Risk Fund" to temper the market forces that encourage sensationalistic and stereotyped media and cultural materials.

The Alliance of Civilizations should take advantage of major media, cultural and sporting events ...

APPENDIX C – FIGURES

Figure C1: Overview map of the Middle East.




Figure C2: White House Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative fact sheet, issued on 9 June 2004.

Fact Sheet

The White House Office of the Press Secretary
Sea Island, Georgia
June 9, 2004

Fact Sheet: Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative

"...[T]he United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace."

President George W. Bush
November 6, 2003
Washington, D.C.

Presidential Action

Today, President Bush led the G-8 in establishing a historic **"Partnership for Progress and a Common Future"** with the Broader Middle East and North Africa to support efforts to advance freedom, democracy, and prosperity in the region. The G-8 Leaders met with Leaders of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Turkey, Yemen, and the new President of Iraq to discuss the challenges facing the region.

Calls for Reform: In November 2003, President Bush announced a "forward strategy of freedom" to advance freedom and democracy in the greater Middle East. Since then, the world has witnessed a gathering momentum for reform in the region: business and civil society leaders issued reform declarations at Aqaba, Sanaa, and Alexandria, where they declared that **"reform is necessary and urgently needed."** At the May 22-23 Arab League Summit, Arab leaders declared their determination to **"firmly establish the basis for democracy."**

"Partnership for Progress and a Common Future": President Bush led the G-8 Leaders today in launching the historic "Partnership for Progress and a Common Future" to support political, economic, and social reform in the Broader Middle East and North Africa. To that end, the G-8 agreed to:

- **Establish a "Forum for the Future,"** which will bring together in one forum G-8 and regional foreign, economic, and other ministers for regular discussions on reform, with business and civil society leaders participating in parallel dialogues. *The inaugural meeting of the Forum will be held in the fall of 2004.*
- **Adopt a "Plan of Support"** that will offer assistance through **new initiatives:**
 - o **Democracy Assistance Dialogue**, which will bring together democracy foundations, civil society groups, and governments from the G-8, the region, and other countries, to **promote and strengthen democratic institutions**, coordinate and share information on democracy programs, initiate new democracy programs, and sponsor exchanges. **Turkey, Yemen, and Italy** will co-sponsor the Democracy Assistance Dialogue and co-host the first meeting in 2004.
 - o **Microfinance Initiative** to help over two million entrepreneurs escape poverty through microfinance loans over the next 5 years. **Jordan** will host a Microfinance Best Practices Training Center and Yemen will host the first microfinance pilot project.
 - o **Literacy Initiative** to assist the region's efforts to halve the illiteracy rate over the next decade, including by **training a corps of 100,000 teachers** by 2009. **Afghanistan** and **Algeria** will co-sponsor this initiative.
 - o **Business and Entrepreneurship Training initiative** to help as many as **250,000 young entrepreneurs**, especially women, expand their employment opportunities. **Bahrain** and **Morocco** will co-sponsor this initiative.
 - o **Private Enterprise Development Facility at the International Finance Corporation (IFC)** to invest \$100 million to finance small and medium-sized enterprises;
 - o **Network of Funds** to coordinate the work of development institutions and international financial institutions working in the region; and
 - o **Task Force on Investment** to assist the region's efforts to improve the business climate.

The Plan of Support also commits the G-8 to work in partnership with the region's governments, business leaders, and civil society to **"intensify and expand"** existing programs, focusing on: **promoting democracy; improving education; and creating jobs and economic growth.**

Figure C3: Letter to Congress on the Ten Steps to Restore the United States' Moral Authority.

Letter on the Ten Steps to Restore the United States' Moral Authority

A Common Sense Agenda for the 110th Congress

The Honorable Harry Reid
United States Senate
528 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
United States Senate
361A Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
United States House of Representatives
235 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable John Boehner
United States House of Representatives
1011 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

February 22, 2006

Dear Senator Reid, Senator McConnell, Speaker Pelosi, and Congressman Boehner:

Over the last several years, the moral authority of the United States has been undermined by the federal government's unprecedented and illegal assertion of authority to subject detainees to abusive interrogations, indefinite detention without charge – often in secret locations – and rendition to torture. The last Congress and the Supreme Court took some important steps to right these wrongs (with the passage of the McCain amendment and the Supreme Court's rulings in the cases of Rasul and Hamdan). But much remains to be done to restore America's reputation as a champion of human rights and the rule of law.

We have joined together to propose to Congress a [ten-step plan](#) as a way forward. Not only does this plan lay out the right thing to do, but it also sets forth an effective counterterrorism policy – one that ensures that the United States is holding the right people, promotes respect for the rule of law, and puts an end to policies and practices that undermine American interests at home and abroad.

Thank you for your consideration. We look forward to working with you to begin implementing these proposals.

Sincerely,

Alliance for Justice
American Civil Liberties Union
Amnesty International
Center for American Progress Action Fund
Center for Constitutional Rights
Center for Financial Privacy and Human Rights
Concerned Foreign Service Officers
Friends Committee on National Legislation
Holy Name Province Franciscan, Office for Justice,
Peace & Integrity of Creation
Human Rights First
Human Rights Watch

Japanese American Citizens League
Liberty Coalition
Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns
National Religious Campaign Against Torture
Open Society Policy Center
Physicians for Human Rights
Presbyterian Church, (USA), Washington Office
Rutherford Institute
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee
United Church of Christ, Justice and Witness Ministries
United Methodist Church, General Board of Church and Society

Figure C4: The 10 Steps to Restore the United States' Moral Authority.

The 10 Steps

(1) Restore Habeas Corpus

Perhaps the most important protection against the arbitrary exercise of executive power, the writ of habeas Corpus ensures that all persons can challenge the legality of their detention before an independent court. The Military Commissions Act of 2006, as interpreted by the current administration, would deprive any non-citizen labeled “enemy combatant” of this centuries-old right. A vote to protect the habeas rights of detainees in US military custody lost in the Senate by just three votes in September. Restoring habeas corpus to ensure judicial review of detentions and provide an important independent check on executive power should be a first order of business for the new Congress.

(2) Stop Renditions to Torture

The United States made great strides when, in 2005, it enacted the McCain Amendment prohibiting the use of torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by any US official acting anywhere in the world. Now the United States needs to get out of the business of outsourcing torture and ill- treatment to other countries. Congress should pass legislation to protect detainees in US custody from being transferred to abuse.

(3) Abolish Secret Prisons

Although the US has long criticized other nations for engaging in forced disappearances – imprisoning people in secret – the Bush administration continues to assert the right to do so. While the administration claims to have emptied its secret CIA prisons for the time being, it has not ruled out their future use nor accounted for all the prisoners who are believed to have been secretly detained. Congress should pass legislation to ensure that the secret detention centers are shut down permanently and that no one in US custody is forcibly disappeared or otherwise held incommunicado. Congress should also demand an accounting of the whereabouts of all those formerly held in secret locations.

(4) Hold Abusers Accountable

Although more than six hundred US military and civilian personnel have been implicated in hundreds of known instances of detainee abuse, including 25 cases where the detainee ultimately died, very few have been prosecuted. Only eleven service members have been sentenced for more than a year – all low-ranking; no one has been convicted on the basis of command responsibility; and only one civilian – a contractor to the CIA – has been prosecuted. Congress should demand that the Pentagon and Department of Justice vigorously prosecute those responsible for engaging in, authorizing or condoning detainee mistreatment, including those up the chain of command. This would deter future abuse and demonstrate to the world the US’s condemnation of such ill-treatment.

(5) Hold Fair Trials

In October, the Congress authorized the use of military commissions to try non-citizen detainees in US military custody. The rules for these commissions raise serious concerns about the integrity and fairness of such trials. Of particular concern, the rules allow the use of coerced evidence and evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment if obtained before January 2006 and found “reliable” by a military judge, and also allow the government to withhold from defense lawyers information about how the evidence was obtained. As a result of these provisions, defendants could be convicted based on the wide array of so-called “enhanced” interrogation techniques allegedly employed by the CIA – techniques including extended exposure to extreme cold, prolonged sleep deprivation, and “waterboarding” (mock drowning). Congress should amend these rules to ensure that detainees are not convicted – and possibly executed – based on evidence obtained through torture or other abusive treatment, are provided a fair opportunity to confront their accusers and are given a meaningful chance to gather and present evidence and witnesses.

(6) Prohibit Abusive Interrogations

In the Military Commissions Act, Congress amended the War Crimes Act of 1996, specifying a list of eight “grave breaches” of the humane treatment requirements of the Geneva Conventions that constitute war crimes. Two of the primary authors of the Military Commissions Act, Senators John Warner and John McCain, have publicly stated that they intended to criminalize the abusive interrogation techniques allegedly used by the CIA in the past. But the administration continues to imply that it could continue the CIA secret detention program – and presumably the abusive interrogations that go with it. Congress should clarify that the full range of abusive interrogation techniques that have been prohibited for use by the military’s new field manual on interrogations are similar prohibited – and criminalized – if used by the CIA.

The 10 Steps (Continued)

(7) Close Guantánamo Bay

The US continues to hold close to 400 detainees in Guantánamo Bay, many of whom have been held for five years without charge and without access to court to challenge the legality of their detention. Those detainees who have engaged in terrorism-related crimes should be charged and held accountable; those who are not charged with criminal acts should be released. The administration should work with its allies to develop appropriate procedures in accordance with U.S. and international human rights and humanitarian obligations to ensure that detainees are not returned to countries where they face torture or abuse. Congress should hold oversight hearings about the future of Guantánamo, and push the administration to put forth a plan for its closure.

(8) Respect the Laws of War

The US's unilateral reinterpretation of the Geneva Conventions to support its questionable detention policies undermines respect for the rule of law around the world and puts US service members and civilians at risk if US's policies and practices are adopted by others. Of particular concern, the US Congress in October enacted (in the Military Commissions Act) an overbroad definition of "unlawful enemy combatant" that turns a civilian munitions worker, a mother who provides food to her combatant son, and a US resident accused of giving money to a banned group into "combatants" who can be detained without charge in military custody or tried by a military court. The new Congress should strike this definition of "unlawful enemy combatant" and reaffirm the US's longstanding commitment to the civilian – rather than military – courts to prosecute civilians who violate the law.

(9) Protect Victims of Persecution From Being Defined As Terrorists

The United States will never be able to effectively fight terrorism if it cannot distinguish between terrorists and victims. Yet, overbroad terrorism-related bars in US immigration law are now being used to define innocent victims as terrorists – and denying them entry to the United States. Hmong and Montagnards are being labeled as terrorists solely because they took up arms alongside the United States during the Vietnam War. Rape victims who were forced into sexual slavery by West African rebel groups are being labeled "material supporters" of terrorism because they performed household chores while enslaved. Congress should adopt a reasonable definition of terrorism that does not equate victims with terrorists and define any armed group as terrorist, even if it does not target civilians.

(10) End Indefinite Detention Without Charge

Ever since 9/11, the Bush administration has relied on a variety of means to detain individuals indefinitely and without charge. The material witness warrant law – a law that allows the government to temporarily detain key witnesses who pose credible flight risks – has been misused to detain dozens of terrorism-related suspects, some of whom were held for months without charge. Now, the administration is improperly invoking the "enemy combatant" label to justify the indefinite detention without charge of Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a lawful US resident who since the eve of his trial for credit card fraud in 2003 has been held in a military brig in South Carolina. Congress should use its oversight authority and pass legislation that will prevent the administration from evading basic due process protections, and, in so doing, undermine respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF AUTHOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL NEIL J. MAKEPEACE U.K. ARMY

Lt Col Makepeace was commissioned into the Royal Corps of Signals in 1985. He has served as a squadron commander in the 1st (United Kingdom) Armoured Division and as Chief of Staff of the 1st Signal Brigade. His last assignment before attending the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) was as a requirements manager in the UK's Defence Procurement Agency. Following the JAWS course, he will command 7th Signal Regiment, a NATO-affiliated unit based in northern Germany.